

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ 3 YEARS
AFTER THE GULF WAR

Y 4.F 76/1:IR 1/15

U.S. Policy Toward Iraq 3 Years Aft...

MEETING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

FEBRUARY 23, 1994

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



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U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ 3 YEARS AFTER THE GULF WAR

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee will come to order.

The Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East meets today in open session to discuss U.S. policy toward Iraq 3 years after the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War.

Despite the pain of international sanctions, the Iraqi Government remains today in violation of key U.S. Security Council resolutions. Saddam Hussein, of course, maintains his grip on power and there are few signs that the demise of his regime is imminent. The current unsatisfactory state of affairs seems capable of continuing indefinitely.

We are anxious to hear our witnesses today and their assessment of the current situation in Iraq and their recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward Iraq.

Our witnesses today will include Congressman Robert Torricelli.

Bob, I will ask you to just go ahead and take a seat there if you would.

And later Professor Amatzia Baram, a visiting fellow with the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars and Professor of Middle East History at Haifa University; Mr. Graham Fuller, senior analyst with the Rand Corporation; and Ms. Laurie Mylroie, currently an Arab affairs fellow with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

We welcome each one of these witnesses. We will start first, of course, with Congressman Torricelli and then we will move to the panel of private witnesses.

Mr. Torricelli has taken a very great interest in the events in Iraq and Iran. He traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan last summer, so we welcome you before the subcommittee, Mr. Torricelli, and we look forward to your comments.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much for this opportunity and for focusing attention once again on events within Iraq and the regime of Saddam Hussein.

As you mentioned, last summer I traveled to northern Iraq to occupied areas inhabited by the Kurdish people. While there I met with refugees in whose eyes the reign of terror of Saddam Hussein is very real on a daily basis.

I visited a few of the hundreds of villages that were literally razed by Saddam Hussein. I met with some of the survivors of the more than 200,000 Kurds that were killed in the last decade, heard chilling stories. The Iraqi army would arrive without notice, destroy literally every building in a village, destroy the crops, poison the fields, drive people off into the desert where they were machine gunned to death by the thousands.

Stories of genocide are only now beginning to become documented and beginning to be heard. Stories of terror and loss of lives equal to any other that I have ever heard at any point go largely still unnoticed.

Now, with the war in the Persian Gulf concluded, international monitors on the site, military forces of various nations including our own in northern Iraq, Saddam has changed his methods though not his aims.

Rather than the poison gas and machine gunning and razing of villages of the last decade, he has a new campaign of terror that is economic.

Saddam Hussein realizes that new military action would provoke an international response. But he is still creating pain and terrible suffering among the Kurdish people.

His preferred tactic at the moment is to sporadically interrupt the supply of electric power into northern Iraq. The result is that hospitals, businesses, homes and villages—without notice—lose power for sometimes days or weeks on end. During my own visit, Kurds were experiencing a 2-week interruption. It was estimated that one to three babies per day were dying in the hospitals because incubators would lose power. It has made the rebuilding of northern Iraq economically impossible, leaving it in desperate economic straits.

But that has not been the only economic strategy. He has also used an internal blockade against his own northern provinces to prevent the shipment of spare parts and raw materials, making the traditional farming practices and light manufacturing impossible.

He has also debased his own currency in an attempt to wipe out the personal savings of Kurdish citizens, the most significant example of which was a decision last year to withdraw all 25 dinar notes. Because of the economic separation of the Kurdish people from the rest of Iraq, when the notes were withdrawn and replaced by other currency, they could not get the replacement currency. Hence, the loss of part of the operating currency of the region permanently.

Despite all of the obstacles and this ongoing campaign of economic terror, Kurds have been working to rebuild their society and create an independent and self-sufficient region.

Democratic elections were held in May of 1992 with the result there is now a fully functioning parliament with an executive and judicial branch of government, 24 hospitals and small clinics, a 36,000-man army, the building of schools, the providing of basic services. All of this has been done in spite of the economic embargo and in spite of the campaign of terror of the last decade.

But now, Mr. Chairman, there is a new irony from the most unlikely of sources that is making the rebuilding of the Kurdish peoples' lives all but impossible. And it does not come from Saddam Hussein and it is not orchestrated from Baghdad. It comes from the United Nations and we are complicitors in it.

In a great irony of history, when the embargo was placed on Iraq, among its victims were the Kurdish people because the scope of the United Nations embargo is not defined by those areas over which Saddam Hussein maintains power. It is over the former geographic boundaries of Iraq before the war. So the Kurdish people who we have pledged to help, who our own money goes to assist, our own forces are there to help protect, are now covered by the embargo.

So the Kurdish people must get spare parts from within Iraq. They cannot because of Saddam Hussein's own policy. They also cannot get it from the West because of the embargo. They cannot get electric power because of Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror. They can also not get generating equipment or petroleum from the West because of our embargo.

We may have taken their lives. We are making the building of an independent economic structure and their own survival all the more difficult.

It is strangely akin in its own way to what has happened in Bosnia. The United Nations has an embargo on arms going to everyone but the victims, like the people we now are trying to help, the Muslims in Bosnia. This is exactly akin to what has happened. Kurds are being governed by the rule of unintended consequences.

Mr. Chairman, only a couple of months ago when administration witnesses came before the committee, I asked these questions of the State Department and asked that it be justified. You joined me at that time in asking the administration to explain why this had not been changed. I am unaware that either my question or yours has been answered.

The suffering of the Kurdish people goes on. These are an industrious people who have fought bravely to prevent genocide. They live in a rich land. They are not asking for aid. They are asking for a chance to rebuild their economy. And yet we try to supply food, give them sustenance, when all they are asking for is a chance to rebuild and survive.

This is a policy that makes no sense. All we need to do is have the United Nations remove from the blanket coverage of this embargo these Kurdish areas. They can begin to fend for themselves.

It is not simply a question, as I have noted, Mr. Chairman, of a loss of economic opportunity. It is costing lives. Daily. And we are doing Saddam Hussein's work for him until this embargo is lifted from the Kurdish people.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this chance to offer these thoughts to you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Torricelli appears in the appendix.]

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, we thank you very much for your testimony. Very well done.

I would like, if you have a moment, just to ask a question or two about it.

KURDS IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Now, you argue very persuasively that we should lift this embargo on those areas that are being administered by the Kurdish leadership. That is an elected leadership, is it not?

Mr. TORRICELLI. It is an elected leadership. I know of no one who has taken issue with the conduct of the elections and, indeed, we meet regularly with the leaders of the Kurdish people.

Mr. HAMILTON. I notice in your statement that you say the Kurds are making an effort to become not only self-sufficient but independent. That was not my impression. Do they seek independence, in your judgment?

Mr. TORRICELLI. There are different Kurdish groups. The elected leaders that were chosen in the May 1992 elections that I have met with and deal with the U.S. Government are not seeking an independent state.

Mr. HAMILTON. The elected leaders are not?

Mr. TORRICELLI. Yes. So the U.S. Government position of recognizing the territorial integrity of Iraq not seeking change of its borders is not contradicted by dealing with these Kurdish leaders.

There are, of course, other Kurdish groups that do seek independence but in my judgment, by allowing trade to take place with the Kurdish elected representatives in this region, we are not contradicting our policy of recognizing the territorial integrity of Iraq.

When I used the word independence, perhaps the better word would have been seeking some level of autonomy within Iraq.

Mr. HAMILTON. You are not advocating that U.S. policy should support independence for the Kurds?

Mr. TORRICELLI. I am not and I do not believe that removing them from within the embargo would further that aim or cause a complication in that policy.

Mr. HAMILTON. You say in your statement we should be rewarding the one segment of the Iraqi population that has succeeded in freeing itself from Saddam's rule, not punishing them, and that is a pretty powerful observation, it seems to me.

Now, of course, you mentioned a moment ago, and if you ask the administration about this, they say they are going to maintain these sanctions because they do not want to undermine the territorial integrity of Iraq. How do you respond to that? What is your response to that?

Mr. TORRICELLI. Well, as I understand it, both in the previous administration and the Clinton administration the policy has been that the embargo would be removed if there was full compliance with the United Nations sanctions and indeed certainly if there were a democratic government in Iraq and one that did not present problems in the international community.

Well, Saddam Hussein is not administering the Kurdish areas. These elected representatives are. They are not violating any Unit-

ed Nations sanctions. They are not causing any difficulty for the international community. And they are freely elected by the Kurdish people. None of those things which has given impetus to the sanctions against Iraq exist with regard to the Kurdish people.

These people are victims of Saddam Hussein. They have lost arguably a quarter of a million people to genocide. Maintaining the sanctions simply serves no objective.

LIFTING OF SANCTIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me ask you this. What would be the reaction in Turkey if the sanctions were lifted on the northern part?

Mr. TORRICELLI. If the sanctions were lifted, and it were not made clear that this is not part and parcel to policy to give independence to the Kurdish area, making clear that we respect the territorial integrity and are not seeking an independent Kurdish nation, it should cause no complications.

The Turks are, of course, concerned about both the independent efforts of the Kurds, which we do not support and they oppose, but they are also gravely concerned about Kurdish refugees fleeing into Turkey and giving rise to this independent effort.

Every day that we maintain this embargo and cause economic suffering to the Kurds, we are both politically radicalizing the Kurds and increasing the flow of refugees into Turkey which contradicts Turkish policy. Therefore, in lifting the embargo for the Kurdish area, it is a question of the tone of how we do it, making clear why we are doing it, that it is done in concert with Turkish objectives and international objectives and it is not contradicting them.

Mr. HAMILTON. When you say radicalize, the risk is radicalization of the Kurdish leadership. What do you mean by that?

Mr. TORRICELLI. Because there are competing Kurdish leaders. There are those who seek a Kurdish state which includes both current Iraqi and Turkish territory and those that simply want to safeguard the Kurdish people within the Iraqi state, gaining some limited autonomy within that federated state.

American policy, international policy has been to support the latter, not the former, independence effort. That is obviously critical to Turkey. I believe that lifting the embargo on the Kurdish people is important to achieve and that effort does not contradict it.

GAO REPORT ON U.S. ASSISTANCE TO THE KURDS

Mr. HAMILTON. I just want to say for the record that the subcommittee has requested a GAO report on the U.S. assistance program. We requested it last year. The program of assistance to the Kurds. We expect that report any day now. When we get it, I want you to take a careful look at it, if you would, and you and I then should consult with respect to what steps we ought to take.

Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, if I might. In closing I want you to know that, having raised this issue now at almost every level of the U.S. Government, I have yet to have a senior official who argues with the premise or the recommendation. This is simply a problem that just is not getting resolved

Mr. HAMILTON. The recommendation being the lifting of the embargo?

Mr. TORRICELLI. Lifting the embargo for the Kurdish people, consistent with the kinds of assurances that you and I just discussed.

Mr. HAMILTON. Very good.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Torricelli. We appreciate your testimony.

PRIVATE WITNESSES

I will ask the other panel of witnesses to come forward if they would. Your statements, of course, are going to be entered into the record in full.

It does not make any difference to the chair which way we proceed there. Does it make any difference to the witnesses as to who goes first?

Ms. Mylroie, we will let you begin, if you would, and we will just proceed from left to right across the table.

And I think you have been advised by staff to keep your remarks limited. Your written statement, of course, will be put into the record in full but I am anxious to get to the discussion with you, so I would request that you keep your remarks in the range of 5 minutes, if you would, please.

Ms. Mylroie.

STATEMENT OF DR. LAURIE ANN MYLROIE, ARAB AFFAIRS FELLOW, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

Ms. MYLROIE. Thank you. I spent the past summer in Iraqi Kurdistan on a grant from the U.S. Institute of Peace. I am grateful to the U.S. Institute of Peace for providing part of the basis for my testimony.

Since last spring when the Clinton administration clarified an initial fuzziness about its policy toward sanctions on Iraq—that it was not going to lift them—the economic situation in Iraq has deteriorated dramatically. But the Clinton administration's policy toward Iraq is relatively passive and the result is a prolonged standoff.

I would like to begin by discussing first the problem of conceptualizing Iraq and the difficulties in Iraq before discussing secondly the problems in the standoff and third concluding with some suggestions about how to increase the pressure on Baghdad.

First, conceptualization. The Bush administration looked to the so-called Sunni elite to overthrow Saddam while maintaining stability in Iraq which was equated with the territorial integrity of Iraq about which we hear so much.

Now, that Sunni elite never moved against Saddam. The policy evolved but its premises still linger. Above all, if maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq is your number one priority, then the Kurds are a problem because they do in some way challenge, undermine, weaken the territorial integrity of Iraq.

But if you see that the greatest challenge to the United States regarding Iraq is Saddam Hussein and his regime, if that is your top priority, to get rid of it, then the Kurds are an asset. And I would say there is an insufficient thinking about the Kurds as an

asset because there is too high a priority put on the territorial integrity of Iraq.

I would like to underscore Representative Torricelli's comments. If one looks at the Kurds as an asset, then one does not want to keep Iraqi Kurdistan/northern Iraq under the same economic sanctions as the rest of Iraq under Saddam's control. Furthermore Saddam has been fairly effective in undermining those sanctions and rebuilding his infrastructure. The telephones work in Iraq proper but not in Kurdistan.

The Kurds are also an asset to the United States because they form the backbone of the Iraqi opposition, the Iraqi National Congress. That is a very, very important organization. It runs in Kurdistan a refugee camp, a variety of media programs, it has a little army, but its primary function is as an institution through which the various disaffected elements in Iraq can coordinate. The essence of totalitarianism is to cause people to mistrust one another so they cannot work together.

The INC is an institution based in Salah al-Din. It is counter to that atomizing effect of totalitarianism which is how Saddam stays in power. Kurds were essential to the formation of the INC. They had the stable political institutions to help that institution get started.

Iraqi Kurdistan should not be seen only as the home of the Kurds but the base of the democratic opposition to Saddam. Its economic well being should be encouraged in order to further undermine Baghdad.

Now, I think, if the bureaucracies were not so focused on the territorial integrity of Iraq, they would see how the United States could do more to exploit the strategic opportunities offered by the fact of Kurdish control of northern Iraq. There are a lot of people traveling between northern Iraq and Iraq proper and Iran, the two countries which present the greatest threats to the United States in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

You can learn a lot about both Iraq and Iran there, which is why I try so frequently to go to Iraqi Kurdistan. What is the United States doing, for example, to exploit the intelligence opportunities presented by Kurdish control of northern Iraq?

Now I would like to address the problems of the continued stalemate. It is hard on the population, as Representative Torricelli said. It is to the immense credit of the Kurds that they were able on a dime to take control of their own affairs and administer them without fighting with one another. It is not something that every people can do, as we have seen in Somalia.

However, we cannot assume that the social cohesion of Iraqi Kurdistan can be maintained forever under such harsh circumstances. Around Christmastime, there was fighting between one Kurdish organization and the Islamic Kurds. That frightened the population to see fighting among Kurds even in the cities.

Nor can we get out of this stalemate, though, by lifting sanctions. It will be impossible to maintain long term monitoring over Iraq's weapons programs if you lift sanctions. Once Saddam can sell oil, he will kick out the weapons monitors and their equipment. It will be difficult to reimpose sanctions because even one veto from China can prevent that. And I will stake my reputation as an Iraq expert

on that. Long term monitoring with this regime in power is an illusion.

One cannot assume either that while we wait—we want to keep sanctions on, Saddam has to go, it is going to take time—but we cannot assume that he is not going to do something in that period. For one thing, he would like to kill his opponents, the opposition leadership. One well-placed car bomb at some meeting in Iraqi Kurdistan could finish off the INC leadership and the Kurdish leadership and put Saddam in a much better position and he really would like to do that right now.

Then there is Saddam's attitude toward us, America. I know it may be hard to understand but he wants revenge for what we did to him. He tried to kill President Bush.

And I would like to introduce something. The World Trade Center bombing—what about the World Trade Center bombing? I will be very brief but it is something that I think people should pay some attention to.

There are two individuals in the world with rewards, \$2 million, on their heads for acts they committed in the United States. Those people have those \$2 million rewards on their heads for the World Trade Center bombings. They are fugitive suspects, they are indicted. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, \$2 million. Abdul Rahman Yasin, \$2 million.

[Wanted posters appear in the appendix.]

These people are, wonders of wonders, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef—they are Iraqi passport holders. Iraqi passport number M0372369. Abdul Rahman Yasin, Iraqi passport number M0887925. They played more important roles in the World Trade Center bombing than any of the suspects on trial. Their journeys to the United States began in Iraq. Abdul Rahman Yasin is in Baghdad right now. The FBI has talked to him there.

Does this not signify anything to anyone?

Is it not possible that Saddam Hussein might be behind the World Trade Center bombing?

Is it not something we should look into?

As far as I know, that has not happened.

OK. If you would like to discuss this further, I am more than ready to do that. I think that is clear.

Let me turn to discuss a few things that could be done to increase pressure on Baghdad so we are not in this slow wait for Saddam to fall.

Demand the return of Abdul Rahman Yasin who is sitting in Baghdad. It will put the world on notice that we think that Saddam just may be a suspect in the bombing and we have a bigger quarrel with him than what happened during the Gulf War and it will take away the pressure of the calls to lift sanctions.

Jordan is Iraq's chief source of foreign exchange. Cut off the Iraqi selling of oil to Jordan. It should be possible to get a country like the UAE or Qatar to supply oil to Jordan on the same terms that Iraq does. Moreover, that oil tanker trade is used to smuggle contraband between Jordan to Iraq. Illegal things that Iraq is not supposed to have.

Three, ease the application of sanctions to northern Iraq.

Four, pursue war crimes, crimes against humanity. The Clinton administration initially talked of it and then it seemed to get dropped.

Five, try to do something about the terrible destruction in the south in the marshes. And the beginning of any such action would be a vociferous campaign in the United States and Europe against the genocide that is going on there, hopefully leading them to some action.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Mylroie appears in the appendix.]

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you.

Dr. Baram.

STATEMENT OF DR. AMATZIA BARAM, VISITING FELLOW, THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, PROFESSOR OF MIDDLE EAST HISTORY AT HAIFA UNIVERSITY

Mr. BARAM. I would like to approach the subject from one additional angle and then I will address also the Kurdish issue.

In my judgment, the dual containment policy as defined and implemented so far by the administration toward Iraq has been producing reasonably good results. If you want to be more active, you can produce perhaps better results but still it is not really a failure.

It has weakened the Ba'th regime and you could see the beginning of the Ba'th serious problems maybe 2 years ago, maybe 18 months ago. And it has forced it to make concessions to the United Nations. It has not so far brought about a change of regime and cannot be expected to do so soon. Economic sanctions by their very nature work slowly.

The insistence on keeping sanctions on Iraq until the Ba'th regime is ready to comply with the United Nations Security Council resolutions is thus justifying itself.

On the domestic political level, there are signs that very slowly Saddam Hussein is losing ground within his own elite. True, many Iraqis are blaming the U.S.A. for their plight. However, as indicated by the Iraqi press itself, many people have also started asking difficult questions about the wisdom of their own leadership.

What I would suggest—I, by the way, think that the Jordan angle is a relevant one but you cannot cut Jordan off without offering it an alternative. But I think also that one should start now thinking about the post-embargo period. Hopefully the embargo will succeed and perhaps some additional acts will succeed to depose Saddam and to get rid of his regime and whatever regime that comes instead, if it is not fundamentalist Islamic or Ba'th will be hopefully a little more democratic. Obviously if the INC is part of it, the Iraqi National Congress, I have no doubt it will be more democratic and also more friendly toward America.

But even under the best of circumstances, my feeling is that the administration is not paying enough attention now to what should be the case after the embargo is lifted, whenever it is lifted. And there are also indications Saddam Hussein at least believes that he will be able to lift it without complying with all the U.N. resolutions.

It must be clear to the Iraqi regime, to any regime, that if they go back to the production of nonconventional weapons they are going to suffer from a renewed embargo. This has to be made very clear from the outset and as a historian I can say that Iraq has been a problematic society since its inception. A lot of domestic strife and quite a lot of foreign aggression. And I would say that they have to be on notice that they are on long-term probation.

Obviously if they do not produce arms of mass destruction, they should get—if this is indeed a more democratic regime—international support and naturally recognition and this is the kind of thing which has to be made very clear to them continuously. People in Iraq should understand this. At present I am not sure they get the point. Somehow people in Iraq feel that everybody is after them.

As for the Kurdish issue, one way of getting rid of Saddam and his regime is the embargo. I think another way, you should increase your propaganda work in the direction of Iraq. If you can provide safe haven for Shi'ites in the South, I think this would be a very important humanitarian solution but I am fully aware of the tremendous logistical and military difficulties of establishing such a safe haven.

As for the Kurdish issue: the regional government of northern Iraq, or Iraqi Kurdistan, that is another way that you can weaken Saddam and on this I agree with Congressman Torricelli and with Laurie. Let me say very simply that people in Baghdad know what is happening in Kurdistan. Right now, the economic situation in Kurdistan is not much better than in Baghdad. And so there is no big example to follow.

By helping the Kurds and the INC in Kurdistan in every way, either de facto lifting embargo over Kurdistan or de jure, you are going to undermine Saddam's rule in Iraq.

Again, it is a slow process but people in Baghdad eventually know. If you build a television station, a strong one, in Kurdistan and broadcast the true picture of an improving standard of living and democratic life in Kurdistan, that is going to be the best propaganda against Saddam Hussein and his regime.

I tried to enumerate issues that could be very helpful to the Kurds short-term, and I would say, relatively cheaply as well.

They need an oil refinery. Not a very big one, enough for 3 million people. They have oil wells. I suppose some of you know that they have some oil wells that are capped now within the area under their control and north of the thirty-sixth parallel, mainly around Kuwisanjaq.

I would say it seems to me very improper and strange indeed that Saddam Hussein is allowed to use the riches of his country, to take oil out of his land, his soil, to turn it into oil products and so on and the Kurds and the INC are not allowed to do the same. It is like we are saying, that in order to keep the territorial unity of Iraq, with which I agree, we are preventing the Kurds from enjoying the same rights that Saddam Hussein enjoys.

This is going to be a tremendous boost to the Kurdish economy because if they can produce their own oil derivatives, their economy is going to be on much more solid ground and that is a very impor-

tant step. Economically and even politically it should not be too difficult.

Another issue, for example, is they lack spare parts for their cement factories. A couple of them. Very important for reconstruction and rebuilding those 4000 villages which Saddam has uprooted and I think there is no real problem in supplying them enough spare parts for those factories.

Another issue, I would point out that Kurdistan is a natural exporter of fruits and vegetables. Also of tobacco but that of course is becoming a big no-no now in the United States as I am learning. But one way of helping them in a meaningful way is to help them build a few food processing factories because due to the difficulties of transportation much of this yield is rotten. And that is a shame. These are not very expensive things but they are very useful.

A Kurdish militia. I do not think that Kurdish independence is a practical idea. I am one of those people in Israel who do not see with tremendous enthusiasm the idea of completely, fully fledged Palestinian independence either. For economic and strategic reasons a Palestinian-Jordanian federation seems to offer a better solution. Leaving the Palestinian issue alone, I think that Kurds and the INC should be allowed to do the same thing which we are going to help the Palestinians do now in Gaza or Jericho. Namely, they should be allowed to build a militia—the Kurds have a militia but it is very badly equipped—that will be equipped with light arms, just like the Palestinians, and with a uniform and nonlethal military gear.

This is not very expensive. Of course, it has to be done in coordination with the Turks. But I do not see how the Turks are going to be very much against it. If they are, then just nonlethal military equipment.

Another issue for example is spare parts and combined harvesting machines. The Kurds do not have enough of those. And very soon they are going to start the harvest. Without that, again, a lot of which they can and do produce is rotting.

And another point: I would suggest considering the possibility of defreezing part of the Iraqi frozen assets in America and making it available not only to the Kurds but to all the democratic opposition movements, mainly the INC and the Kurds who are working against Saddam.

I am aware that this is not an easy issue legally speaking because of the whole issue of the embargo and Iraqi unity, and again I want to be on record saying that I think that Iraqi territorial unity is important. And the Kurds will have, to my mind, in a democratic Iraq, a meaningful autonomy and freedom. In the meantime, however, the Kurds and the INC are very short of immediate cash.

Now, it is interesting that those who suffer from it most are those whom, as I understand it, the administration should be most interested in. Those are the intellectuals, the teachers, the engineers, the public servants and so on in Kurdistan. Mainly those secular intellectuals who are on government pay. I think we should try and help these guys rather than make their lives much more difficult.

So I would just sum by saying that this issue of defreezing the assets should be looked into.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Baram appears in the appendix.]
Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Professor Baram.

Mr. Fuller.

STATEMENT OF GRAHAM E. FULLER, SENIOR ANALYST, RAND CORPORATION

Mr. FULLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My esteemed colleagues have raised a number of very critical issues, many of which I would have touched on. I do not want to repeat them because I think they have very adequately touched them.

I would like to just present a couple of these thoughts from a slightly different angle to reinforce much of what they have said.

First, I think it is particularly important to recognize the tremendous magnitude of this Iraqi issue within the whole history of the modern Middle East. It is very easy for us to become fixated on the latest bad guy in the Middle East but I think Saddam Hussein and the whole Iraqi regime needs to be viewed as something exceptional and special. This is not Middle East politics as normal. It is very, very, very different. Regimes as brutal as this that survive so long are really quite exceptional.

Saddam Hussein has started two wars in the Middle East; he has gassed his own people; he has produced endless refugee flows; and he has the grossest violations of human rights anywhere. It is these very facts which enable, I think, both the United States and the U.N. to adopt highly intrusive policies toward a region that basically, I think, we would just as soon not have to be highly intrusive with all the time.

This is not like a Hafez al-Assad, this is not even an Iran, I would suggest to you, despite our discomfort with both Syria and Iran in other respects. In other words, should not the magnitude and the gross character of this regime spur us to adopt bolder policies, both domestically and in the U.N., and to encourage other Security Council members to do the same to try to change what is an exceptional circumstance?

Let us look at the Kurdish zone for a moment. Both of my colleagues have pointed out the importance of this. To put it in its simplest words, we are not talking about a Kurdish zone necessarily, we are talking about liberated Iraq.

This is liberated Iraq, it is not just Kurds who are there but every single political group in opposition to Saddam Hussein now has offices and representation there. So this is the beginning—it is a mini temporary capital, if you will—until something can be established in Baghdad itself. And I think it removes the onus from thinking, well, are we in favor of separatism, are we encouraging separatism.

Frankly, I do not think anybody wants to see a separate independent Kurdistan in that region. It will create problems. The entire Arab world is deeply opposed to it. Turkey is, Iran is. Nobody wants to see nations break up.

The simple fact is Saddam Hussein is breaking up Iraq as a result of his policies. Alienating Shi'ites, alienating Kurds, making life intolerable for them to live there.

We are suggesting, I think, that pursuit of the support for opposition groups and pursuit of a long-term federated democratic Iraq is the only way to keep it together. If you do not have a federated Iraq and it is not democratic, if Kurds find life intolerable within this state, then they will not stay. And I think it is 50/50 now at least as to whether they will stay over the longer run.

If we want them to stay, there are two ways to do it. One is hire Saddam Hussein to keep it together by force and the other is a state in which people are willing to live and that is democratic and Federal in character.

Let me mention briefly the fact that we do have problems in the Middle East with other states that are very nervous about the way we are proceeding.

Syria and Saudi Arabia, in particular I think, are quite key regimes. Both of them loathe Saddam Hussein but I think there is nervousness that American policy is either pushing for a more democratic regime and if it is democratic it means that the Shi'a of Iraq will have greater influence in politics. Both these states are nervous about this fact and they are afraid that our agenda is to separate and divide Iraq.

It is very important for our diplomats and our foreign policy to make quite clear that we do seek to preserve Iraq and that these democratic and Federal means are the only way to preserve it in the longer range future.

I think it is important to point out that this kind of an Iraq will not favor Iran. Indeed, the Shi'ite population of Iraq feels that Iran has manipulated them very considerably to Iran's own ends and they are not warm toward Tehran at all. The longer this goes on, though, I should say, the more desperate the Shi'ites in Southern Iraq will become and their only other alternative to look to now will be Iran, which we and many others do not want to see.

I would therefore suggest, Mr. Chairman, that U.S. policy perhaps be more explicit in where we are going over the long run. There is a widespread body of belief within the Middle East that the United States does not really want to see Saddam Hussein go, that he is very convenient, that we were able to win a war against him but by keeping him there we are supposedly keeping Iran at bay, which I think is preposterous. If anything, the longer Saddam stays there the easier it will be for Iran to play in that game.

They think that—those with more Machiavellian views think that—we want Saddam Hussein there to justify the American military presence in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and elsewhere and that it is a cynical game on our part. Furthermore, it is not that many in the region think that, because we did not overthrow Saddam Hussein and do not seem to have been successful—Saddam himself is encouraging this belief, making Iraqis think that you cannot get me, you cannot move me, the U.S. Government itself wants me in here. They do not like me but they know that I am the best deal that they are ever going to get and that I serve their interests so do not any of you commanders or any of you population think about doing otherwise.

This is exceptionally pernicious and something that our policy needs to make very explicit that it is not our goal. So, yes, it is the removal of Saddam and it should not stop there, Mr. Chairman. What we are talking about is a Germany or Japan after World War II syndrome. We are talking about removing a Stalin from the Soviet Union but it is not enough to remove a Stalin, you have got to remove the system that produced and supported Stalin and that is the Ba'th party.

So let the commander that will remove Saddam, that will put the bullet through his head or pull the coup or whatever else, let that commander know that we wish him well in attempting to change the regime but Iraq cannot join the community of nations until there has been fundamental changes in the way that government is run and that means restoration of parliament, rewriting a constitution and some sort of democratic processes for the selection of the next government.

As long as that is on record, there will be no disappointment and no disillusionment. But these same people must know, too, that everything good will happen the minute those conditions are met. That they will immediately be able to sell oil; they will be fully recognized by everyone; there will be cooperation and assistance in rebuilding Iraq. Indeed, I think some of the conditions set by the U.N. would probably be negotiable at that point with a new Iraq.

Lastly, I would suggest that the Arabs in the region and the Iraqi people themselves must know that we are not seeking to impose the INC as the next cabinet and President of Iraq. The INC is a remarkable organization. It has brought together for the first time in modern Iraqi history a group which virtually has freely discussed all aspects and all problems of that country: Kurds, Shi'ites, fundamentalist Shi'ites, secular Shi'ites, Sunnis, left, right, a whole bunch of people. This is a remarkable accomplishment. These people are, in effect, establishing the basis for future understanding of how Iraq will be. Nobody knows who might be elected in the future Iraq. We are not seeking to impose the INC.

I think you all know that but I am not sure that the Saudis and the Syrians and others who are concerned with this thing fully understand that we are not imposing an American regime or even a purely pro-American regime in that area.

So you are faced with an immense challenge, Mr. Chairman, in this region. I am optimistic that with a will and with a long term carefully thought out policy we can bring dramatic change to the last real holdout of the old, harsh, cynically pan-Arab authoritarian regimes that Saddam Hussein typifies.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fuller appears in the appendix.]

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Thank you, Mr. Fuller, and each of you for your excellent testimony.

STATUS OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

Let us begin now with just your assessment of Saddam Hussein. Is he stronger or weaker today than he was a year ago?

Mr. FULLER. I will start. I hope my colleagues will join me. I would say he is weaker. There are rumors and perhaps—

Mr. HAMILTON. Is he vulnerable?

Mr. FULLER. I think he is more vulnerable to a coup and family and clan disputes than ever before.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you all agree with that?

Ms. MYLROIE. Yes. I think the key turning point was after the defeat of President Bush. Saddam tried to say, well, the next guy is going to lift sanctions and President-elect Clinton made what I would consider some ill-considered statements. But by March they clarified that sanctions are not going to be lifted any time soon. And, since then, the Iraqi currency has been in a tailspin.

Mr. HAMILTON. If you look at what might happen, I understand my question calls for speculation, but what is the most likely scenario for his removal? A military coup? A popular uprising? He just quits? What happens?

Mr. BARAM. Maybe I will say something. I believe that Saddam started to go down 2 years ago and I am repeating that.

Mr. HAMILTON. I am sorry. I did not hear that.

Mr. BARAM. I believe that Saddam started to lose height, to parachute—

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. He is getting weaker.

Mr. BARAM [continuing]. About 2 years ago and the process has been accelerated during the last 5, 6 months. His main economic problem is inflation. His main social problem is inflation. The tremendous hardships bring about a lot of resentment and there is a lot of evidence of that.

Even in the army, there are people claiming that all of a sudden they realize that the man has made a few judgment mistakes in the last few years.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do we have any reason to think that his successor would be any better?

Mr. BARAM. That is really an interesting question. Nobody can tell, first of all, how a changeover may occur. We are not talking here about anything that is going to happen very early, except perhaps, unless the lone bullet scenario. But basically we are talking about very slow developments and there is a possibility that a very small group of his close associates, people who are very close to him, especially within the security forces, will decide to do him in. Difficult to imagine right now. They tie themselves with him because they are afraid that when he goes, they go.

You have another possible scenario that eventually something totally different will happen but that is what I can see.

Another is something like public resentment that will bring people out into the street, a lot of demonstrations. The army will be reluctant to shoot at these people and then you have a change of regime. This can happen.

But basically if he is replaced, it depends how he will be taken out. If he is taken out by a lone bullet then I would say that there is a very good chance that he will be replaced by a regime that will be more or less a carbon copy of his own.

Mr. HAMILTON. When the panel talks about his being weaker, do you convey by that a sense or a feeling that Saddam Hussein will not be here as a figure in Iraq in the matter of a year or two?

Mr. BARAM. No. We may be talking about 1, 2, 3 or 4 years.

Mr. HAMILTON. You cannot really tell?

Mr. BARAM. Provided that the embargo is kept intact.

Mr. HAMILTON. In the United States we talk here about lifting the sanctions in the event of Iraqi compliance with all of the relevant U.N. resolutions.

Now, that would suggest that there would be no change in U.S. policy against Iraq if Saddam Hussein were deposed and his successor did not comply fully.

Is that the right message for us to be sending at the present time?

Is that the way we ought to state our policy with respect to lifting of the sanctions?

Mr. FULLER. Mr. Chairman, when you speak of, will the next leader be better than Saddam Hussein, I think the terms and conditions that we set will be quite critical. I doubt if he could be worse but even if he were marginally better, it would be important for him to know that he cannot enjoy that position until the pre-conditions that I and others have mentioned are met. That there would be essentially no real relief. That, I think, changes the game quite considerably.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me ask you this. Should the primary goal of U.S. policy be the removal of Saddam Hussein or should it be full compliance with U.N. resolutions?

Mr. FULLER. I think the Clinton administration has focused on full compliance with the U.N. resolutions because it is a nicer way to say, "get rid of Saddam" and we feel that those conditions are such that Saddam never could meet them so that they are tantamount, in effect, to demanding that Saddam go.

I feel that we should be more explicit about Saddam and the Ba'th party going because I am fearful that the population feels that we do not really want Saddam to go and Saddam encourages that.

U.S. POSITION ON SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ

Mr. HAMILTON. So you do not really like the way the U.S. Government is formulating its policy position with regard to the lifting of the sanctions now?

Mr. FULLER. At first, I thought it was a more clever formulation because it was more principled. It talked about principle rather than people. In the end, I am not sure that it is quite as effective but perhaps my colleagues here—

Mr. HAMILTON. I would like to hear the others comment on that.

Ms. MYLROIE. I am not impressed with the clarity of the Clinton administration's position and I do not really understand it.

Resolution 687 was a formal cease-fire of the Gulf War in which the Bush administration linked sanctions to the weapons of mass destruction. When Saddam complies with the U.N. weapons inspectors, then sanctions are supposed to be lifted. But the Bush administration later said we made a mistake and we are not going to lift sanctions while Saddam is there, but we will still pursue the destruction of weapons of mass destruction.

The Clinton administration sometimes says Saddam has to comply with all U.N. resolutions and stop repressing Kurds and Shi'a to show that we can trust him or something. That does not really make an awful lot of sense. I mean, the repression of Kurds and Shi'as has very little to do with trust.

I, like Graham, would prefer a clearer position. One can say we want to enforce 688 and we are going to use sanctions to do that and we are prepared to use our veto to do that in the United Nations if other countries disagree. But then you have to be prepared for some kind of muscular multilateralism where the United States is taking the lead and clarifying things.

Mr. HAMILTON. How would you state U.S. policy toward lifting the sanctions?

Ms. MYLROIE. I am not sure what it is.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK.

Mr. Baram, you wanted to—

Mr. BARAM. To me, the U.S. policy vis-a-vis lifting of sanctions is very clear. I do not see any fog and mists around.

It says very clearly that Iraq should comply with all the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. It is not only 687, it is also 715, to which, by the way, the Iraqis agreed, but it is also 688, which means human rights.

Now, I think that the administration recently added one more condition. That is Kuwait. Iraq has to recognize Kuwait and the new border but that is not very clear.

But about 688, I think—

Mr. HAMILTON. Are we moving the goal posts?

Mr. BARAM. I do not understand the question.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, are we acting—

Mr. BARAM. Oh, I see what you mean. Are you changing the rules of the game in the middle of the game?

Mr. HAMILTON. Right.

Mr. BARAM. Well, maybe you are.

Mr. HAMILTON. I can understand how my phrase might not have been a good one for you. Are we changing the objectives a little bit here?

Mr. BARAM. I think you have already. Yes. I think that the first thing was—let us not forget that 687 has clause number 22 which says once all other clauses within 687, mainly disarmament, and once other issues like long term supervision that is 715 which was adopted later, are fully complied with, according to testimony of the United Nations supervision teams and so on, once this is on, the embargo should be lifted. That is what 687 says.

You changed your position and decided that lifting the embargo is dependent also on compliance with 688 which is human rights. I personally support it. I believe that if Saddam changes his spots and starts respecting human rights, he will not last for more than 1 week. And 1 week perhaps is an overstatement. In other words, I do not believe Saddam can do that.

But I do not see any problem with that definition because I do not believe that either Saddam or one of his clones can ever, ever, satisfy U.N. Resolution 688 on human rights.

But I do agree that the United States should insist on compliance with 688. I think this is relevant. And this in a way is slightly different but not drastically so from what Mr. Fuller pointed out. If a new regime, say a junta of generals comes on top and they comply with 688, then it means Kurdish rights, it means human rights in Iraq which obviously is also Shi'a rights. It means Iraq

is becoming much more democratic, and the INC becoming an integral part of Iraqi politics.

I will just end by saying that my expectations of a new regime in Iraq are not exaggerated. If they look like Egypt or like Jordan, I would not be too distressed. But if they look like Saddam Hussein or his cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid, then really there is not much to talk about.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. Now, I want to get back to this question of how we formulate our policy on lifting the sanctions. Should we try to hold out some promise or relief from sanctions for a successor government?

Should we spell out publicly some promise or relief from these sanctions in order to encourage the Iraqis to change government and get rid of Saddam Hussein?

Mr. FULLER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think the essence of the problem is to make sure it is absolutely clear to everyone, to people in the region, to the Iraqi citizenry and to the would-be coup makers or assassins over there relative to the next government in Iraq, that there are conditions that they must meet if they are to achieve relief.

If they do meet these conditions, not only will they achieve relief but there will be a generous outpouring of investment and opportunities for Iraq that will be very rewarding to them. But that has to be quite clear in advance and not simply that Saddam himself needs to go.

The difficulty, I think, in part comes in the international arena here because many—I think at least the Russians, perhaps the French and the Chinese in the Security Council, all of whom agree that we do not want Iraq to have nuclear weapons—might begin to say that if Saddam Hussein gets a clean bill of health in the nuclear area they might be inclined to say OK, that is good enough because that is what the specific resolutions talked about or at least their nonsale of oil, if I understand correctly. They could start selling oil if they get a bill of health on nukes or nukes and other weapons of mass destruction.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

Mr. HAMILTON. It may be helpful here to kind of spell out these various U.N. Security Council resolutions. It gets pretty confusing for some of us at least.

You have Resolution 687 which requires the destruction and the dismantlement of the mass weapons and imposes trade sanctions on Iraq, including the ban on the sale of oil.

You have Resolution 688 which calls on Iraq to cease repression of civilians.

You have Resolution 706 and 712 allowing limited oil sales by Iraq under certain conditions.

And you have Resolution 707 which provides for access of U.N. inspections and then you have Resolution 715 calling for long term monitoring of Iraqi weapons programs.

Now, when the administration comes along and says that we believe that the Iraq must fully comply with all U.N. resolutions for sanctions, what do you understand that to mean?

Does that mean that every one of these resolutions have to be totally, fully complied with before sanctions are lifted?

Is that your understanding of American policy?

Mr. BARAM. This is my understanding.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right. And what is your understanding of the terms required by the United States for lifting the ban on oil sales?

Mr. BARAM. The same.

Mr. HAMILTON. And those for lifting import sanctions?

Mr. BARAM. The same.

Mr. HAMILTON. The same. They have to comply with all of these resolutions?

Is that the understanding you also have, Ms. Mylroie, Mr. Fuller?

Ms. MYLROIE. I find it less absolutely clear. My understanding is that there is a kind of tension and fudge. The clearer you are about keeping sanctions on while Saddam and his regime are in place, the more coalition problems you generate from countries that want to lift sanctions, sell oil, make money in Iraq. And there is that kind of tradeoff.

And the Iraqis try and play on that kind of tradeoff and they try to maneuver the head of the U.N.'s special Commission, Ambassador Ekeus, into a situation where he comes back and says we have completed our job. And then the Iraqis will come to the U.N. Security Council and say, listen, your Ambassador says he has completed his job, now is the time to lift sanctions, let us sell oil.

And I would like to emphasize that that is really the key component of the sanctions because the question of imports really has been made almost meaningless. I mean, we have seen how Iraq has rebuilt, it has managed to smuggle almost anything in, I think, through Jordan. So it is a question of prohibiting oil sales. That is the key sanction and I do not know, at least to me it is less clear.

Mr. BARAM. Maybe also major arms systems, which they cannot import now.

Mr. FULLER. Yes. But, Mr. Chairman, I think the letter of the law, and I ask my colleagues to correct me if I am incorrect, I think the letter of the law in terms of the U.N. resolution is that once compliance on the nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction is met, then oil sales by Iraq can be resumed.

Our policy as the United States would be to try to fudge this as much as possible and say, well, there are a whole lot of other things but technically, technically, I do not think the oil sales require the meeting of any of those other areas, as much as we would like them to have to meet those areas.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, you are suggesting that there really is a difference between the position of the United Nations interpreting these resolutions and the position of the United States?

Mr. FULLER. And our preference. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And the United Nations focuses much more on Resolution 687, which is on the weapons of mass destruction?

Mr. FULLER. And the oil is linked to that.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is right. I understand.

Mr. BARAM. Specifically, it is linked to that in clause number 22 within 687.

The only two resolutions which are not material, which are not relevant, are 706 and 712. Iraq does not have to sell oil in order to get the embargo lifted.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, Professor Baram, do you see a difference between the United States and the U.N. interpretation of these resolutions?

Mr. BARAHM. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you agree with Mr. Fuller's observation?

Mr. BARAHM. Yes.

RESOLUTION 687

Ms. MYLROIE. I would just like to make one comment. 687, which at the time was called the mother of all resolutions, is huge. There are many, many provisions to that resolution. It is the formal cease-fire to the Gulf War. Iraq renounces terrorism in that resolution, accepts the independence of Kuwait and the Kuwaiti border, it goes on and on.

However, the way that resolution was written, it linked the sale of oil to the weapons of mass destruction because the Bush administration thought we will give Saddam or the guy who will follow him the incentive to comply with what the most important parts of that resolution were judged at that time to be. I do not think anyone imagined that Saddam was going to continue and continue in this very defiant style.

Mr. HAMILTON. I want to be very clear on this.

Is it your view that the condition for lifting the oil embargo requires compliance only with Resolution 687?

Ms. MYLROIE. Not with Resolution 687, with certain paragraphs in 687 related to the destruction of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK. And if that is complied with, then in your view you would lift the ban on the sale of Iraqi oil?

Ms. MYLROIE. I would not because I think that the permanent enforcement of that ban on weapons of mass destruction is impossible because if you allow Iraq to sell oil, you say, OK, Mr. Saddam, you are in compliance, you have destroyed all those nasty things, you can sell oil.

Then if you find a month or two from now Saddam starts to make these weapons inspectors ineffectual until over a period of years they are useless, the United States comes back and says, gee, we think that Saddam is up to nasty stuff, building weapons of mass destruction which are banned by the U.N. Security Council, we want to reimpose the oil sanctions. I venture it will be impossible to do. One country, one member of the—

Mr. HAMILTON. Are you moving the goal posts?

Ms. MYLROIE. Oh, yes. We made a mistake in April of 1991. We might as well admit it because otherwise we make no sense of what has been achieved. It is just not workable.

Mr. FULLER. But U.N. members, I think, other U.N. Security Council members will probably interpret this according to the quite clear letter of the law and that is where the complication comes. We might not favor the sale of oil at that point but technically there should be no further bar to Iraq unless there are new resolutions or unless we persuade other people to agree that the other

conditions should be met that are not specifically stipulated by the U.N. resolution.

LIFTING OF OIL BAN

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Mylroie, let me just ask you, in your view, should we ever agree to lifting the oil sales ban as long as Saddam Hussein is in power?

Ms. MYLROIE. No, we should never agree for two reasons. One, as I said, long term enforcement is impossible. The man is going to rebuild. That is clear. Secondly, to do so means to betray the Kurds and the democratic Iraqi opposition.

When I was in Iraqi Kurdistan this summer I spoke with many deserters from the Iraqi army. They made clear their morale is terrible, they do not get fed. But once Saddam has the resources to feed his army, he can go after the Kurds.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you agree with that, Mr. Fuller and Dr. Baram?

Mr. FULLER. Absolutely. Absolutely. I think there should be no relief whatsoever. It is the highest single priority we can establish.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you would acknowledge you are moving the goal posts, too?

Mr. FULLER. We are moving the goal posts in terms of the sale of oil, yes. There are other resolutions, as you have referred to, that want other things but is our job to persuade others in the U.N. and elsewhere, in effect, to move those goal posts in the interests of a much broader problem.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Baram.

Mr. BARAM. If I may say, I disagree with Laurie on actually one issue and that is that the United States should officially adopt the position that until Saddam and his regime are gone no oil sales.

I think the Clinton administration's definition is much more elegant and legally much easier to defend. If you wish to go to the United Nations and try to shove down their throats Laurie's idea, I am all for it but you will never make it. Never. Because this goes contrary to the United Nations charter. You cannot impose on a nation a government. You can do something else. You can demand certain things and you have done so in Resolution 688.

And so if you demand of Saddam complete compliance with 688, and I do not feel embarrassed about moving the pole, now I learned a new expression, I have no problem with that. If you say also, Mr. Saddam, you must recognize Kuwait and the new border (Resolution 833).

These are two stipulations the man can simply not accept. If he accepts that, then I suppose he will offer President Clinton to marry his daughter or something like that. It is just not thinkable that he would accept that, according to U.N. definition. And so to my mind this is a reasonably elegant way of doing things, basing yourself on the United Nations resolutions which exist.

But, yes, I agree with both my colleagues, that the final goal should be that as long as Saddam is there, there is no oil flowing again into the markets and I accept Laurie's argument. A new regime may be adopting new priorities. It is not easy, it is not automatic but it may happen.

For Saddam to adopt new priorities, to my mind, is near impossible if not totally impossible. And so I will give it very high chances that once the oil starts flowing again he will erode the supervision system. He is very careful, he is very clever, he knows how to do that. And you will have no answer to it because none of his actions will be drastic enough to justify the reimposition of the embargo.

Mr. HAMILTON. Did we make a mistake voting for Resolution 687?

Mr. BARAM. The way it is, in hindsight, yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you agree with that, Dr. Mylroie?

Ms. MYLROIE. We were primarily responsible for drafting it. I find the logic difficult to understand unless the assumption was that Saddam was going to be overthrown and there would be a more compliant character.

We should also remember that at that time there were others pressing Resolution 688 whose purpose was to relieve the assault on the Kurds that was going on at that time. And we insisted, no, we must finish 687 before we do 688.

We were more concerned with that mother of all resolutions than a very simple resolution which calls on Saddam not to repress his population.

But I think in the long run, the resolution that calls on Saddam not to repress his population is more in America's interests and more consistent with American values.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Fuller, do you agree?

Mr. FULLER. Yes, I do.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to commend you for arranging this timely hearing, as we mark the third anniversary of Operation Desert Storm and try to reflect on what our policy should be with regard to Iran and Iraq.

OIL TRADE BY IRAQ THROUGH JORDAN

Just to follow up on the last question about how important it is to maintain the sanctions with regard to oil, is there some oil trade now going on by Iraq through Jordan?

We keep hearing reports that they are able to sell their oil through Jordan. What do the panelists know about that?

Ms. MYLROIE. I would like to address that. In Iraqi Kurdistan this summer, I met a defector who told me all about Iraq's imports and exports. It is a wonderful place to learn about Iraq. And he emphasized to me—and it is verified by others, too—that Jordan is Iraq's single most important source of foreign currency, something like \$500 million a year. That is the oil trade.

Secondly, Jordanian banks are very, very important because they provide access to the international banking system.

Another defector told me that the tankers which carry the oil, sometimes the Iraqis use them—you know, there is not oil in them, there is something else in them. And it is also mentioned in the book "Spider's Web". It is terribly, terribly important to cut that off. And I do not see why the United States cannot go to a country like the United Arab Emirates—we care about Jordan's stability. Fine.

The United Arab Emirates or Qatar, we did save them in that war, and say we would be very grateful if you could supply your Arab brothers in Jordan oil on the same terms that Iraq does in exchange for which the Iraqi trade will be cutoff all together, which is also in the interests of the UAE.

I do not really understand why some kind of vigorous diplomacy cannot achieve that end. It is terribly important to do.

Mr. GILMAN. Jordan has no access to oil other than Iraq today?

Mr. BARAM. Not to any major source. Jordan is getting all its needs, 95, 97 percent of its needs, from Iraq, 50,000 barrels a day crude and 25,000 barrels a day—roughly—oil derivatives. And at first it was legitimate in the sense that the U.N. recognized that Iraq owed Jordan about \$800 million and they wanted to help Iraq repay the debt and yet it does not give Iraq any cash.

Iraq did that but for the last 18 months or so Iraq has been selling oil to Jordan, giving oil to Jordan free of charge. Now, there are two interpretations. I believe that Laurie is right. It seems to me as far as I know that Jordan is actually using that oil in order to buy commodities in the West and give it to Iraq free of charge. So it is like a barter trade. But there are some people who believe that, no, this is just a present. Saddam Hussein is giving King Hussein a present and he is getting nothing in exchange for the last 18 months. This is not very much like Saddam Hussein. I find it difficult to believe.

Mr. GILMAN. So this is an open valve, really, for Iraq to maintain their sales of oil despite all the sanctions, despite whatever we are saying.

Mr. FULLER. I think it is important to recognize that Jordan is in this case not pro-Saddam Hussein and seeking to prop him up but simply has very little other options, as Laurie mentioned, in terms of the oil, receiving its oil. Its economy is in very bad shape after the Palestinians were expelled from the Persian Gulf during the last war. Remittances from workers all over that region have been drastically reduced. The Saudi assistance to Jordan in that area was cutoff because the Saudis did not like King Hussein's position. They are not pro-Iraqi and indeed King Hussein has publicly called for Saddam Hussein to step down.

But they are desperate and they are deeply dependent. I think as Laurie suggested, only by replacing that dependence with some other form can we really get Jordan to comply.

Mr. GILMAN. How does Jordan react to the sanctions? Have they asked that the sanctions be continued or that they be lifted?

Mr. BARAM. On Iraq?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes.

Mr. BARAM. Well, Jordanian cabinet ministers have visited, a couple of them, Baghdad recently and they demanded the immediate lifting of the embargo. The Jordanian press is pressing continuously for the lifting the embargo. However, the king and his brother have not said a word about it.

I tend to believe that Jordan will be glad to get a replacement from Saudi Arabia or whatever Gulf state and be off the hook of this dependence on Saddam Hussein. But we have to recognize that in the Jordanian public opinion there is a lot of support for Saddam still. We have to recognize that, too.

Mr. GILMAN. And the Saudis are unwilling to sell to Jordan at the present time?

Ms. MYLROIE. I think there is ill will between Jordan and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. That is why I suggested the United Arab Emirates. They have a lot of oil and it is less of a clash of personalities and individuals. They could supply Jordan.

Mr. GILMAN. That is a good suggestion.

RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

Can the panelists tell me what the state of relations are between Iran and Iraq today? How do you view the announcement, for example, last week that Iran and Iraq held 3 days of talks in Tehran?

Mr. FULLER. Sir, the Iranians have a long history of having their cake and eating it, too, when it comes to the Iraq question. During the recent Gulf War, Iran was able on the one hand to rejoice at Saddam's defeat, his suffering, his loss of aircraft which were—you know, Saddam sent his aircraft off to Iran for safekeeping and they somehow got painted with Iranian Air Force designations ever since then.

Mr. GILMAN. Have they ever returned any of those aircraft?

Mr. FULLER. I do not believe they have returned any of them. But at the same time they were able to shout at the United States grossly intervening in the area and killing Muslims and this kind of thing so they really did have their cake and eat it, too.

Let us look at what Iran wants in the region.

I think Iran, of course, hates Saddam Hussein. He launched war against them and caused untold suffering in Iran over the period. But to the Iranians, a weak Saddam is probably better than most other options because he is prostrate, he probably cannot really do anything to Iran that is going to be significant in the near future and, at the same time, he is keeping a pro-American Government out.

I think if you ask the Iranian Government today would you rather have Saddam Hussein or a democratic federated and pro-Western regime, they would say we will take Saddam because it keeps the West at bay.

But I do not think Iran is planning to—I do not think we can speak seriously about Iran poised to take over Iraq should Saddam fall. This myth is propagated—even Saddam likes to propagate it to support himself.

The Iraqi Shi'a are Iraqis, they are Arabs. They have some religious sympathies with Iran but they do not want Iran to tell them what to do in the future and they will not tolerate it.

Mr. GILMAN. Do the other panelists want to comment about the relationship between the two countries?

Mr. BARAM. Well, it is like ambivalence rules the waves. There is a lot of hate, a lot of mistrust on both sides. And from time to time they are talking and then talks break down for whatever reason. Now there is a new resumed effort to have some talks. But in the meantime, there is commerce, a lot of smuggling across Kurdistan into Iraq of all sorts of contraband goods.

And I do not think the two countries are going to—and there are, by the way, some military clashes here and there, off and on. Not between regular units of one side and the other but between—like

the Iranians are trying to hit anti-Iranian opposition to which Saddam gives shelter and so on.

I am less optimistic than Mr. Fuller though at the moment I agree with your analysis. But if Iraq breaks down, if Iraq turns into Yugoslavia and there is such a possibility even though I give it only 25 percent or 15 percent chance, then you might very well have the Shi'ites of Iraq sitting between the horns of a dilemma. If they do not ask for Iranian help, they may lose. If they ask for it they may be losing again because eventually the Iranians will never go away.

And in such circumstances there is no telling what is going to happen, especially if the Iraqi Shi'a do not have any strong local leadership to focus this kind of public sentiment. At present, there is no obvious such leadership in Southern Iraq.

And so under such circumstances fundamentalistic movements, especially the one based now in Iran, may have more influence than their fair share, so to say. What this means is that the United States should do more to strengthen the INC.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you care to comment also, Ms. Mylroie?

Thank you for your comments, Professor.

Ms. MYLROIE. Well, I would just caution us against a line that has come out of Baghdad since the end of the war that, you know, we are the guardians against Iranian backed fundamentalism, terror, chaos and anarchy. And a second point of disagreement is that the Shi'a being leaderless, the only option is these clerics in Iran. To some extent I would really qualify it, that may have been true during the Gulf War but, that has changed because of Iraqi Kurdistan.

The Kurds are, as Graham said, free Iraq. In free Iraq are any number of groups, the most significant of which is the Iraqi National Congress. And I think what they are doing—people are going all the time back and forth. The weakening of Saddam's regime means he cannot control the people who work for him any more, they will do anything for a bribe and a small bribe at that. The whole system becomes more porous.

The idea is you cannot get a coup in Iraq. But these groups sitting in northern Iraq can coordinate the disaffection and provide a leadership for all the resentment in Iraq that is going to elbow out the Shi'a clerics and I believe that the people now, the INC in northern Iraq, are fully capable of doing that.

The Shi'a blame the clerics. Again, one should go to Kurdistan and talk to these people that are sitting there—I do not know if you saw Michael Wood's film last night—how angry the Shi'a are at the clerics in Tehran whom they regard as betraying them. These people came and they raised these slogans and caused the world to be fearful and to turn around. The Kurds got saved but they did not, why? Because of Bakir Al Hakim and those people.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, I thank the panelists for their views on that. One other question.

IRAQI POLICY REGARDING MARSH ARABS

Can you briefly outline for us the Iraqi policy regarding the marsh Arabs? When did they decide upon that policy and how has

it been implemented and why does Saddam want to destroy this ancient people? Are we witnessing a genocide of the marsh Arabs?

Ms. MYLROIE. Yes. We are witnessing a genocide of the marsh Arabs. There were longstanding plans for irrigation canals which would take away the salinity in that area. And the Iraqis have taken those—this dates back to the 1950's, OK? 1930's, 1940's, 1950's. And they have taken those plans and under the guise of those plans, improving the state of the agriculture, have built tremendously huge canals, dikes, a kilometer wide, 30 kilometers long—just huge, with the aim of draining the marshes where Saddam's opponents have taken refuge.

Now, I think that it even goes beyond merely what a nasty government would do to crush a rebellion. I think part of what Saddam does, part of what moves him, is revenge. Those people rebelled against me, I am going to obliterate them off the face of the earth. And in the north, that is what he did. You go to villages that are nothing but rubble.

Why did the people who destroyed the villages of Iraqi Kurdistan have to level every building to the ground so that there is not a wall standing?

I believe the answer there is revenge. There is no memory of what there was and Saddam is taking his revenge now in the south and it really is genocide.

Mr. BARAM. I do not think it is revenge, quite honestly. I think it is just an example. It is much more practical and cynical and cold blooded than revenge. He wants to set an example.

Also, let us face it. He has a problem. These people in the marshes are tribes, generally speaking, supportive of the revolutionaries, Shi'a revolutionaries. The Shi'a revolutionaries are penetrating from time to time into the area outside of the marshes and are making Saddam's troops' lives quite difficult, especially at night.

At night, Iraqi army units are not moving in the countryside of the Shi'a south. And so he has here a practical problem: how to eliminate this opposition. Saddam never hesitated to kill women, children and the elderly, hoping to deter his rivals, nor did he hesitate to kill noncombatants if they were in the way.

Yes, I think you can apply to it the term of genocide in the sense that he is killing a lot of people, the vast majority of whom are noncombatants, and that he is finishing off a whole way of life. It is not exactly Hitler's style. Saddam is not Hitler. There are differences. Saddam is much colder than Hitler and he is much more calculating.

But I would say that what is happening there is from his viewpoint a major strategic effort. He wants to completely finish off this population, especially that this is on the border between him and Iran and so they have contacts with the Iranians and he does not know how to deal with them.

I think, yes, for him this is a strategic objective of very high priority and it is also an example. He has to set an example. That is what happens to somebody who opposes me.

Mr. GILMAN. How many marsh Arabs were there or are there?

Mr. BARAM. I think something like—the tribe, the marsh tribes, during the Iran-Iraq war—we are talking about something like

maybe a quarter of a million people, maybe 300,000 people. There were more but those are the core. That is about what we are talking about. You can go as high as 700,000 but I think that is far too high because you are talking about people who really live on the marshes and off the marshes in this very special lifestyle and I think you are talking about maybe a quarter of a million people or maybe even less.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes. I would be pleased to yield.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is an important line of questioning. I want to ask your view on U.S. policy toward the south here.

I think, Professor Baram, you talked about safe havens and the like. What should we be prepared to do to address that problem that Mr. Gilman has raised, that terrible problem there? What should we be prepared to do?

Mr. BARAM. Let us start from the best option seen from the viewpoint of those people, OK? To conquer the area and hold it and give them safe haven.

Can you do that? You can, but is it feasible politically and militarily and so on?

Mr. HAMILTON. How do you do it?

U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION

Mr. BARAM. With your power, allow me to say, you can conquer any place on this planet. And so you conquer that area, too. It is only the question—

Mr. HAMILTON. You want us to send in the Marines?

Mr. BARAM. I did not say I wanted you, I said you could. I feel that Somalia has taught everybody a lesson. You have to think 10 times before you send a force. You have to define the mission very clearly and you have to stick to your mission and you have to provide those who go there the necessary force to perform the mission.

That is why I feel that because it is bordering on Iran, between Iran and Iraq, between Saddam Hussein and Khomeini, two people who are not very friendly toward you people, it is very difficult. I do not know if politically it is feasible.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Fuller, Ms. Mylroie, what should we do?

Ms. MYLROIE. It is tough. I think certainly it should be something which we protest on a regular basis. The idea that we do not mention it and therefore do not run the risk of showing ourselves impotent—I disagree. I think it helps to keep world attention focused on that outrage of genocide but that is, you know, not that satisfactory.

Something that might be considered is bombing those canals. They are dirt canals and they are easy to break up. Remember, our coalition aircraft are flying over that area all the time, they are flying over there.

Now, people come back and say, well—

Mr. HAMILTON. So you would favor bombing?

Ms. MYLROIE. Well, if it were practical. If it were practical—that area is in the no fly zone of Southern Iraq.

Mr. HAMILTON. What do you mean practical?

Ms. MYLROIE. Well, people say—OK. Bomb these dikes. They are nothing, you know. You must be able to easily destroy those dikes.

Then the water will flow and that will be an immense help to the people, to the agriculture. It is dying because there is no water.

Mr. HAMILTON. So you would favor bombing the dikes?

Ms. MYLROIE. Well, then some people would say, oh, but they can rebuild them. I do not know. It seems to be a very technical question—what does it take to bomb a dike, what does it take to rebuild a dike. I would examine that very seriously, whether those dikes could be meaningfully attacked. And if they could, I would do it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Professor Baram, would you bomb the dikes?

Mr. BARAM. No. And the reason—as far as I know—again, if I am wrong, then of course, yes. But as far as I know, the dikes would be rebuilt within 24 hours.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Fuller, would you bomb the dikes?

Mr. FULLER. I frankly would not pass judgment. I think it is a military question as to how efficiently it could be done and how quickly they could be rebuilt and how effective it would be. I just do not know the answer to that.

Mr. HAMILTON. And if it could be done quickly and if they cannot be rebuilt, you would bomb them?

Mr. FULLER. I think we need to have a more vigorous policy toward that whole southern no fly region where Saddam operates with total impunity right now.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, what I am trying to get at, I think, all of us agree we need a more vigorous policy but I am trying to figure out what that is.

Mr. BARAM. I can suggest—again, it is a military issue and should be judged by military professionals, especially air force because I am a tank person, I do not know anything about the air force so do not get from me any advice on air force.

Mr. HAMILTON. You do not want to send the tanks in?

Mr. BARAM. No. But that is what I said, you could if you wish but I do not think it is feasible American politics-wise. However, what you could do, maybe, maybe, that is the kind of thing to explore, declare the southern area of Iraq not only a no fly zone to the Iraqis but also no tank zone for the Iraqis and also a no artillery zone for the Iraqis.

Mr. HAMILTON. No what?

Mr. FULLER. No artillery.

Mr. HAMILTON. No artillery?

Mr. BARAM. No artillery zone. If you do that, you will never achieve 100 percent success, you will achieve perhaps 50 to 60 percent success. But it will mean that it will be much more difficult for him to oppress these people.

But this, too, I want to point out has to be judged according to American political capabilities, domestic or foreign, because this means that you will fly many airplanes, a huge number of missions, you may lose airplanes and pilots, and this is going to be an all-out war, again, probably without much international support. That is very, very, difficult, domestically and also internationally. There is need for military and logistical thinking what can be done to help. But I am not saying callously: go to war, and who cares.

Mr. FULLER. Sir, I would suggest the information war on this, too, is very important. The Michael Woods film which was shown on PBS and a whole lot of other things, special documentaries that

have been produced, I think have a powerful effect not just in this country but internationally as well and serve to keep this issue alive and the egregious nature of Saddam's policies there. It is powerful justification when you are trying to move other countries and the U.N. representatives.

Mr. HAMILTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

ARAB RESPONSE TO GENOCIDE OF MARSH ARABS

Are there other Arab nations who have reacted to this virtual genocide of the marsh Arabs?

Mr. FULLER. There is deep ambivalence in the Arab world on this issue. They are still trying to sort themselves out between that Saddam is an Arab state and should we stand by and allow Western nations, former colonial nations and Western nations to bomb our brother Arabs or not.

Secondly, because the south is so heavily Shi'ite in population, there is anxiety and fear that somehow either Iraq will break apart, the Shi'ites will separate as the Kurds might separate. The Shi'ites will never separate, they are Iraq, they are the majority. Majorities do not separate. But there is the feeling that well, should we get as excited about Shi'ites who may be pro-Iranian in their souls and this kind of thing that cause deep ambivalence on the part of the Kuwaitis and the Saudis and nearly everybody else. So they are kind of standoffish on this.

Mr. GILMAN. But the marsh Arabs are mostly Shi'ites, are they not?

Mr. FULLER. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And yet is no one speaking up for them in the Arab world?

Mr. FULLER. Well, because there are not very many Arab Shi'ites.

Mr. GILMAN. Yes, that is true.

Mr. FULLER. Very, very few. And no state that is Shi'ite in the Arab world.

Mr. GILMAN. Has the European Community spoken up, taken any action with regard to the marsh Arabs?

Mr. FULLER. I do not know of any governmental action. I am sure at the private, NGO-level, there is bound to have been but I cannot speak for formal government action. Maybe the French perhaps.

TERRORIST ACTIVITIES/WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING

Mr. GILMAN. Just one other area.

Saddam Hussein is known as a revengeful type of individual and we have seen at least the finger is pointing at Iraq as one of the perpetrating nations for the World Trade Center bombing, at least some of the perpetrators have taken refuge and found safe haven there and some of them have come from that area.

Do you foresee any further terrorist activities coming out of Iraq as part of the revengeful attitude of Saddam Hussein?

Is he persisting in his efforts to spread terrorism against our own nation?

Mr. BARAM. I can only say that seen from Saddam Hussein's viewpoint, to send anybody to blow up the Twin Towers in New

York was a very stupid thing, had he done it. I do not know if he has done it. Because it was exactly when he expected President Clinton to be kind to him and to change President Bush's policy. But, of course, he may have done it but it would still be very counterproductive from his viewpoint.

I would say that as long as Saddam hopes—and that is what Saddam does hope—that a year from now the sanctions will have been lifted because he will have complied with 687 and 715 and the Security Council will twist the United States' arm and say to them, OK, lift the embargo and the embargo will be lifted.

If this is what he hopes, and I am sure that is what he is looking for, it will be counterproductive from his viewpoint again to start wide-scale terrorist activity against America because it will give you enough evidence against him and then he will never be off the embargo.

If a year from now the embargo is not lifted, or if, a few months from now, he feels that there is no intention to lift it, then I would say by all means expect the worst and he can do something even which goes contrary to his interests for some reason now. But basically I would say look a few months or even a year from now.

Mr. GILMAN. But, Professor, it was only a year ago that the terrorist bombing on the World Trade Center took place at the same time that Saddam Hussein was looking for sympathy and now one of the terrorists is harbored in Baghdad and even our enforcement people were on the telephone with one of them in Baghdad and yet—and we keep hearing information that more terrorist activity is being harbored in Iraq.

Mr. BARAM. Yes. Saddam sometimes—first of all, I have not got yet indisputable evidence, neither have I nor has anybody else, of course, that Iraq is involved. It could be an Iraqi individual, it could be somebody who holds an Iraqi passport, it could be collusion after the crime has been performed. And it could be upon Saddam's order, I do not know. I claim—I am an agnostic about this one.

What I am saying is that it is very possible that Saddam will give orders to do something which to my mind as an analyst of his own interests goes contrary to his interests. And somebody in Iraq would still give these orders, maybe not him personally but somebody under him. This is possible so I would not say to you: "forget about Iraq." Iraq is dangerous. Absolutely.

But if you are asking me when it is becoming really dangerous, I would say look a few months or a year from now. That is when you really have to watch it.

Ms. MYLROIE. I would welcome your question. If I might comment about it, I think we have seen Saddam over the past 3½ years since he invaded Kuwait do a lot of things which were counterproductive to his interests. Remember the time we said, oh, Saddam will not invade Kuwait because an Arab state never did that, invade another Arab state, and we look back and I believe he should have—if he invaded Kuwait then he should have pulled back a little before the war began, maybe a little bit north—all sorts of things Saddam should not have done and we said he would not do. But then he went and did it.

So I am not sure now that I can say that there is anything that Saddam would not do. I think back to that time, late July 1990, we sat and watched Saddam mobilize 100,000 troops on the Kuwaiti border. We said he would not do it. I do not know.

I think this idea Saddam would not blow up the World Trade Center because it is counterproductive, because he wanted sanctions lifted, well, he did try and kill Bush a few months—a month or two later which was counterproductive.

This is the man who is in Baghdad. The 10th of June, *New York Times* article reports that the FBI is calling him in Baghdad. Perhaps we cannot settle this question; there is just no proof. Why do we not ask for the Iraqi Government to return this man who is an indicted fugitive like we do, say, with Libya? I think that is an obvious question. And once we do that, then we will know a little bit more how to proceed.

But if it is true, as I believe that Saddam was behind this, then it shows us what a revengeful man he is, how his rationality is not the same as ours.

He thinks on the one hand he can work to get sanctions lifted. He would like that. But at the same time he can blow up the World Trade Center and try and kill a former President because America is basically spineless and is not going to do much about it.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you for your comments.

Mr. Fuller, did you want to comment?

Mr. FULLER. I would just comment, I guess I come down somewhere in the middle of this. I think Saddam Hussein is capable of anything and he is capable of miscalculation. I do not think at this point Saddam has chosen terror to be one of his chief weapons against the United States. If he had, I think we would see a great deal more than a World Trade Center which I think is still an ambivalent issue.

I agree with Laurie, let them extradite that guy. That would be a good tactic under any circumstance. But if Saddam really wants to implement terror against the United States big time, I think he is quite capable of going after American diplomats in the Middle East, Europe, worldwide, smaller and more modest targets than just the World Trade Center and putting his signature on it if he wants to send a particular type of message.

I do not see that happening yet and I agree with Professor Baram on this, that once he thinks that he cannot have his way by being supposedly a good guy temporarily on the nukes issue, then I think we might see all stops pulled out on that.

Mr. GILMAN. I want to thank the panelists and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

LIFTING SANCTIONS AGAINST THE NORTH

Mr. HAMILTON. We will just keep you here a few minutes longer but I want to cover a couple more things.

On this question of lifting sanctions on the north, which all of you seem to favor and Congressman Torricelli did, the administration as I understand it makes several arguments. One is that it would undermine the sanctions regime against Iraq proper. If we loosen the sanctions in the north, other nations are going to loosen

the other sanctions and you will have a breakdown of the sanction regime.

The second argument they make is it undermines the territorial integrity of Iraq and the third argument they make is that Turkey would oppose it and probably you would jeopardize the operation and provide comfort there.

Now, I know those arguments are familiar to you. You have weighed them. I just want to make sure you have said all that you want to say on the record with regard to those arguments.

Mr. FULLER. I would suggest, sir, the first argument, namely, the breakdown of sanctions would loosen the general sanctions regime against Iraq as a whole in the practice of other nations. Those are, first of all, being violated. Iraq is managing to skirt—

Mr. HAMILTON. It is already breaking down?

Mr. FULLER. Yes. I mean, with the trade across from Iran, illegally across from Turkey, from Jordan, there is a great deal of it going on. So I do not see that it would get much worse and I think it would immensely profit the Kurdish region dramatically and immediately in a way that would be—whereas its impact on Iraq's overall ability to survive sanctions I think would be an insignificant addition.

Secondly, on the breakup of Iraq, as all of us have said, Saddam is breaking up Iraq. The longer this situation goes on, the longer the Kurds are autonomous and other elements, maybe even seek independence, the longer there is this separatism within Iraq, the worse it is going to be for the future. So I do not see that this is leading to the breakup at all.

And lastly the Turkish position is rather ambivalent. The Turks are desperately uncomfortable with the idea of this autonomous Kurdish region because it does affect their own Kurds but the Turks also know they have never had it so good. The regime in northern Iraq today, the Kurdish authorities, are cooperating more precisely and more carefully than any other force in Iraq has ever done in modern history.

Saddam used to turn that border on and off against Turkey whenever he felt like it. The present Kurdish government there now is desperately determined to keep Ankara happy in almost any respect because they know their own future depends on it totally. So I would not use that to typify the Turkish position.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK.

Mr. BARAM. About affecting the sanctions against Iraq, I agree 100 percent with Mr. Fuller. Everything now is getting to Iraq through Iran and Turkey and Jordan except for main weapon systems. And I do not believe that the Kurds would be getting main weapon systems and thus I do not see how they can send it over to Saddam

As to territorial integrity, I would put it in a very different way. As long as the Kurds—

Mr. HAMILTON. Wait a minute. I want to go back there. Everything is already getting through?

Mr. BARAM. More or less.

Mr. HAMILTON. So the practical impact of lifting the sanctions is to let weapons go in, is that correct?

Mr. BARAM. Yes. But the main effect of it will be to allow Saddam to sell not 100,000 barrels a day as he does now but 3.5 million barrels a day and that is the main weapon you have against him.

Mr. HAMILTON. I see. OK.

Mr. BARAM. This cannot be changed if you lift the embargo off the north. Then again about territorial integrity, I will put it this way. If you allow the Kurds to be better off because the embargo is off that part, let us call it northern Iraq, you give the rest of the Iraqis an example. You say, look, here is a democratic regime, look what happens. They are off the embargo, do you not want to be off the embargo, too?

Third, Turkey is extremely important. Turkey is a very important ally of yours and incidentally of ours, too, because Turkey is today one of the most important bulwarks against a resurgent Islam. And I regard Turkey as absolutely a cornerstone of your foreign policy. So you have to work it out with the Turks. If the Turks are saying to you emphatically no lifting of the embargo over Kurdistan de jure so try to work out with them how you can lift it de facto without affecting Turkish interests.

The main thing is the Kurdish area—the more prosperous it is, the better example it is for the rest of Iraq.

Ms. MYLROIE. I also think that there is something there that goes beyond those three things you said about sanctions, territorial integrity and Turkey. There is a kind of emotional perspective. In my written testimony is a quote from a book by a British official who served as an administrator in Iraqi Kurdistan in the 1920's and he complains about how his colleagues in Baghdad all the time made problems for the Kurds, that they were more nationalist than the Arab nationalists. There is an interesting quote in there.

And my own experience, the experience one has with this question even as a private citizen about the sanctions, one has a feeling that sometimes the U.S. bureaucracies are just eager to impose sanctions in ways that become comical.

The United States, for example, is the only country in the world that requires its citizens to get special permission to travel to northern Iraq. If you do not get the special permission, you are technically breaking the sanctions and embargo. No other country does that. The U.K. does not do that. And you will not necessarily get the special permission, too. Your trip has to be in the national interests of the United States.

Secondly, another—this is just kind of funny. The Kurds got a grant to do a project on promoting democracy, teaching democratic values in the University of Sulamania. And this project was blocked by the State Department on grounds that it violated the embargo. People joked, what, the export of democracy to Kurdistan is going to violate the embargo?

So it is I think not just these things but a kind of—not necessarily objective view of the Middle East that leads to this enthusiastic pursuit of the application of the sanctions in Iraq when really one might still try to get people to be a little less enthusiastic in the way that they apply the sanctions on northern Iraq.

Mr. FULLER. It is a super legalism.

IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS

Mr. HAMILTON. I see. OK. I wanted to ask you about the Iraqi National Congress and just get your impressions about how much support that has today within Iraq.

Is there any alternative to it?

What are your impressions about it?

Mr. FULLER. Well, sir, first of all, the Iraqi National Congress is the only opposition to speak of. Virtually every single group within Iraq—and there are some minor exceptions of some Shi'ite groups who have joined and then pulled out at different times—I would say it represents virtually all opposition movements within the entire country across a wide ethnic spectrum, religious spectrum, social spectrum, political spectrum. That is its main value. There is no other focal point for active opposition.

Mr. HAMILTON. Give me some sense of what they stand for. If they came into power, would they support a constitutional democracy, for example?

Mr. FULLER. They have been busily working out over the past couple of years a position on this. Yes. I believe a constitutional democracy—absolutely. Restoration of a parliament, the requirement for full human rights.

And, you know, you can say, well, that is nice rhetoric, of course they have got to say that to appeal to the United States. But let us not forget that it has been the 25 percent Sunni Arabs that have run that country all along.

Now, when—including Saddam—when Iraq is democratic, the Sunni Arab leadership is the one that more than anybody else are going to need human rights because they will not be the dominant majority any more.

Mr. HAMILTON. In any event, there is no question in the minds of you or the other members of the panel that the Iraqi National Congress is a democratic organization committed to constitutional democracy and elections and all the rest.

Mr. FULLER. Yes, it is. I think in all its public statements, that has been quite clear. How it actually behaves in practice and under problems later on, nobody could fully predict but I think there is commitment and intent and belief on the part of a broad group of them to those goals.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right.

Mr. BARAM. I have no doubt about that. I have not yet heard their clear view about Israel and the peace accord and the peace process and maybe this is because they do not want to get embarrassed but at least I would expect them to make an announcement saying that whatever is acceptable to the Arab League is OK by us. Maybe I did not see something that they said but that is the kind of thing that I would expect and there is nothing embarrassing about that one.

But, yes, I think this is a democratic body. My only problem with the Iraqi National Congress is that it is not yet as strong as I would like it to be. That is my only problem with it. And it is not yet as influential in Iraq as I would certainly like it to be. And this is its big drawback. To offset this big drawback they need more help.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it supported sufficiently by the United States?

Mr. BARAM. I am sure you can do more. For example, de-freezing some assets and giving it to the Congress and the Kurds could be contribution.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would you like to see us do more?

Mr. BARAM. Yes, I think this is reasonable. I think this is something you could do. Yes. But I would say, let us not forget—let us keep things in perspective. The INC, Iraqi National Congress, is not Iraq. This is a budding organization, very promising and very positive, and it has been doing progressively better during the last year but it is still far from being influential enough, I will put it this way.

Mr. FULLER. Particularly with the Sunni Arab community and, as I say, the Sunni Arabs, 25 percent of the population, have run Iraq. They are uncomfortable at the strong representation of Shi'ites and Kurds within this group. Proportional representation, naturally. And other Arab countries are disturbed at what are Shi'ite and Kurdish elements within there, too. They feel more comfortable with the traditional Arab leadership.

But I think the United States could do more in terms of facilitating the financing of it. War crimes trials against Saddam Hussein to bring things home. And also to make the point the INC is not the next government. We are not attempting to impose the INC as the next cabinet or the next President. That would be very disastrous.

That would be heavy duty imposition by the United States but it is a body that discusses critical issues for the first time in Iraqi history about how people are going to get along and what their aspirations are.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Ms. MYLROIE. I would like to make some comments as well, if I might.

When the war ended, and I remember this debate, that the Sunni elite was going to overthrow Saddam and no one else could do anything in Iraq. Fine. Well, where is your Sunni elite that is going to overthrow Saddam? It has not done very much.

There was at the time of the war's end a great carelessness toward the rest of the Iraqi population. Kurds and Shi'a and everything but the Sunni elite. So the argument was made everything but the Sunni elite is weak.

Now, I think it is kind of obvious that if you support something else, something that you would like to see develop in a country like Iraq, then it will become stronger and I think that the more—that probably the Bush administration did in fact take that view and that did in fact encourage the emergence of the INC as an umbrella group, as a group that sort of took all the different aspects of Iraqi society under its wings. But that was fought tooth and nail by those who looked to the Sunni elite coup. And some of that still remains.

The INC—I visited all their institutions in Kurdistan this summer. I spoke with refugees who had recently come. They announced the formation of a small army in July, early July. They started to do it. And somehow it became known the INC was starting this little army. So I spoke with people who had recently come there to

Shakalawa. Michael Woods showed Shakalawa at the camp on his film last night. There was a group of three men who had come from refugee camps in Iran and Southern Iran. They had been there for 10 years. As Shi'a, they were thrown out of Iraq into Iran, they were there 10 years. When they heard about this little army, they decided they were going to come and join it. And the trip from Iran to Iraq is very difficult. You have to be smuggled, you have to pay for it, and they had to walk for days in order to get there.

I met two men who had come from Diwaniya, from Iraq proper. They heard about it in Iraq proper, their lives were ruined and yet they had come again to join the INC army.

So I think it is easy to run down the organization, it is very hard to build an organization. More support, they will do better. As I said, they play a terribly important role in this capacity as being the institution which can coordinate within a totalitarian context. And it is a magnet now for defectors from Iraq.

And what is happening is there is a change in its character now that it has settled down in Salah Al-Din and Shakalawa, a change in its character from being a London based exile group with not much to do than to divide up the ministries to an organization in which those people who are not now in Kurdistan but are staying in London are becoming irrelevant and in the meanwhile you are having the defectors from Iraq proper join the INC, become part of this institution to make it a more effective body and it is becoming so.

DUAL CONTAINMENT OF IRAN AND IRAQ

Mr. HAMILTON. We had a statement last year from the National Security Council about dual containment. Is it your impression that U.S. policy in this region toward Iran and Iraq is one of dual containment?

Mr. FULLER. Sir, I think the term dual containment is unfortunate because it really does not present the character of the problem clearly. All it says is that there are two states out there with whom we have real problems, one is Iraq and one is Iran.

I would submit that the differences in almost every single respect between what Iraq is, how it operates, who leads it, who runs it and Iran are massive. The differences vastly outweigh any possible similarities except that we have trouble with both of them.

But therefore to speak of dual containment to me serves no useful end whatsoever. I think it is much more useful to say we have a problem with Iraq—

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think it is our policy today?

Mr. FULLER. Pardon me, sir?

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think it is our policy today?

Mr. FULLER. I think the term actually has fallen into disuse. It was originally meant to describe our problem with two states. I do not think in reality the term means much in a functional way any more but I would urge that we drop the term all together. I would like to see quite different and discrete handling of Iraq on the one hand and Iran on the other which are just miles apart in how you look at it, what they are, how you treat them, where we are trying to go, et cetera.

Mr. HAMILTON. How do you feel, Professor Baram, about that?

And then I will ask you, Ms. Mylroie.

Mr. BARAM. That expression does not embarrass me at all. Never mind the expression, what are you actually doing there? You are containing Iran in the sense that you are making it more difficult for them to get cash because you are afraid, and to my mind absolutely rightfully, that they will use much of this cash in order to build an atomic arsenal. And that is basically containment.

Mr. HAMILTON. We have also said that we are open to dialogue with authorized representatives of the Iranian Government.

Mr. BARAM. Right. So you are actually containing both. They are different, I agree. I think that with Saddam Hussein dialogue is meaningless. With Iran, dialogue can produce something. But dialogue is in order to get somewhere and I think that the American policy vis-a-vis Iran is reasonably clear and to my mind it makes sense.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would you adopt Mr. Fuller's suggestion that we drop dual containment as a characterization of policy?

Mr. BARAM. No. I think that you should try and get into a dialogue with Iran. But your aims are clear and they ought to know what the aims are: (a) no international terrorism, (b) no nuclear weapons or nonconventional weapons and missiles. These are your most important thrusts. And I think you ought to stick to your so-to-say guns in that respect.

Mr. FULLER. Yes. I am not saying change policy, I am saying change the term.

Mr. HAMILTON. I understand.

Ms. Mylroie.

Ms. MYLROIE. Yes, I share maybe this criticism about dual containment. It did have this virtue, though. There was this idea that we should buildup Iraq to counter Iran, this constant balancing between these two maniacal regimes in the Persian Gulf and that has not worked and I think dual containment was one way of signaling we are not going to buildup Iraq as a counter to Iran. To that extent, it served some function.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would you keep it?

Ms. MYLROIE. Yes. I would not use it. Basically, I would be sort of more open. We are trying to get rid of Saddam Hussein's government. With the Iranian Government we have problems, maybe we can work them out, maybe we cannot. But with Iraq we know we cannot work out the problem.

Mr. HAMILTON. I will just add one final question and that is with regard to the Kuwaiti border.

KUWAITI BORDER

That U.N. boundary commission drew the border so that, as I understand it, Kuwait was granted some territory that Iraq used to have. I guess the question is have they drawn that border in such a way that it is going to cause trouble in the future?

Mr. FULLER. Sir, there is much dispute over this. My understanding, and I am not a legal expert or an expert even on this very question. My understanding of it is that the territory in question is relatively small but it does contain some areas where formerly Iraq had some naval installations.

The problem is—and that basically by international law it used to belong fairly clearly to Kuwait some time ago but has been under Iraqi control for 20 years or so. My colleagues may correct me on some of these details.

To me the critical thing is this is immensely emotional now in Iraq because it has been seen that as Iraq has been defeated and prostrate that in a punitive sense, without even consulting with Iraq, changes are being made, the INC is being pushed by the U.S. Government to fully acknowledge this, fully support it, fully support Kuwait's position in a way that makes the INC almost look like traitors in the Iraqi eyes.

And I have real worries when this is so intensely emotional that we should say well, of course we fully support Kuwait 100 percent on this little thing while I think we may be losing a much bigger issue of the confidence of the world as to what we are trying to do and what the INC—is the INC an American instrument or is it an Iraqi patriotic organization?

It is that area that I think we need to stand off, back off and say, look, we will settle border disputes down the road when we have a decent Iraqi Government to work with and a decent Kuwaiti Government and not impose and foist this on now, even if we hate Saddam.

Ms. MYLROIE. The origins of that border lie in an agreement between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire which was the Government of Iraq and the British were in the late 19th, early 20th century trying to keep the Ottomans out of the Persian Gulf. It was a British Gulf and they were trying as much as possible to restrict Ottoman access to the gulf.

One can question the wisdom of maintaining that particular line in the sand. It strikes me that the Kuwaitis, with an Iraqi Government that is prepared to be friendly to them, would win a great deal of good will by being generous in this drawing of the boundary.

Mr. BARAM. I know hardly one Iraqi who can accept the present border. And this means that the two countries are going to face tremendous problems, whatever the regime in Baghdad, and I do not want to underestimate it.

Sadly enough, many Iraqis regard Kuwait as a part of Iraq anyway, and so there is here a major, major problem. I want to remind ourselves that the Iraqis tried to annex Kuwait by force in 1961, 7 years before the Ba'th came to power. It was under General Abdul Karim Qassem.

The only solution to my mind is once you have a more democratic and a stable government in Iraq, and it will be stable and legitimate if it is more democratic, Kuwait and Iraq will have to get into a serious process of negotiations and, to my mind, there is a solution.

You can talk about territorial exchanges, you can talk about lots of things but there is no problem that cannot be solved. But I do believe that this will have to wait until you have a more democratic and stable regime in Iraq.

CONCLUSION

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, I want to thank you very much for your testimony this morning. I know it is a pretty difficult subject. You have done a lot to enlighten us here. We appreciate that very, very much.

I think the testimony has been excellent.

Thank you very much.

We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT G. TORRICELLI

BEFORE THE HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

FEBRUARY 23, 1994

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this timely and important hearing and for providing me with the opportunity to testify before you today.

I would like to discuss with you the grievous situation facing the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq. This is a situation that has faded from public view, but it is one that continues to be one of the world's greatest tragedies.

I travelled to Iraqi Kurdistan last summer, and it was clear to me that the Iraqis in the northern region continue to suffer the effects of Saddam Hussein's genocidal campaign. While in the Zakho region of Kurdistan, I met with Kurdish refugees who live in constant fear of persecution and military assault. I also viewed some of the 4,000 villages razed by Saddam, and met survivors of Saddam's "Anfal" attacks in which more than 200,000 Kurds were murdered in the late 1980s.

While Saddam's aims remain the same, his means of persecuting the Kurds have become more subtle. Rather than using poison gas, the terror today is of the economic variety. Saddam realizes that further military action against the Kurds would provoke an international military response. But he believes that he can create the same pain and suffering by strangling the region economically.

One of his preferred tactics has been to sporadically impede the supply of power to the north from the Iraqi electrical grid. My visit occurred during one of those intentional outages. Saddam cut off all electrical power to the villages near the Iraqi-Turkish border for two weeks. The loss of electricity devastated local hospitals. Medical equipment failures resulted in the deaths of six infants each day during that period. The lack of any central telephone lines exacerbated the deadly situation.

Saddam has also used an internal blockade against his own provinces in the north to block the shipment of spare parts and raw materials to the region. And he has debased his own currency in an attempt to wipe out the personal savings of Kurdish citizens and fuel inflation. For example, his decision last May to withdraw all 25 dinar notes from circulation wiped out tens of millions of dollars of personal savings in the north.

Despite the obstacles posed by Saddam's continued reign of terror against the Kurds, they have made great strides in realizing their dream of an independent and self-sufficient "Kurdistan." The Kurds conducted democratic elections in May of 1992 which resulted in a fully functioning parliament and an executive and judicial branch. The Kurds have kept 24 hospitals and smaller clinics running, they maintain a 36,000-member army, and they maintain an impressive system of primary and secondary schools.

But their task, which would be monumental if they had only Saddam's economic strangulation contend with, has become insurmountable in the face of the economic embargo that has been instituted by the United Nations, and supported by the United States. The United Nations embargo affects not only that part of Iraq ruled by Saddam's totalitarian regime, but also the Kurdish region. Combined with Saddam's internal embargo, it has rendered futile Kurdish efforts to rebuild their war-torn infrastructure.

One cannot help but notice the similarity between this situation and the horrifying events that have unfolded in the former Yugoslavia. The international arms embargo against the warring factions in the Balkans has only served to lock in a tremendous disadvantage for the Muslims, who wish to fight back against Serb aggressors, but who are prevented from obtaining the means to do so.

In much the same way, the international economic embargo on Iraq has locked in a tremendous disadvantage for the Iraqi Kurds. While the will of these people to rebuild their homes and villages and shake off the ravages of war and persecution is remarkable, they are being denied the resources they need for revitalization. It is appalling that a people that has lost hundreds of thousands of its citizens to Saddam Hussein's brutality is now unable to take control of its own destiny because of a painful economic embargo instituted by the United Nations.

When I was in Northern Iraq, I watched as Kurdish citizens desperately sought to rebuild their devastated energy and industrial infrastructure and revitalize their agricultural production. Unfortunately, their attempts were feeble without the machinery and spare parts that are essential to the rebuilding process. Indeed, I was particularly moved by the sight of former inhabitants trying to rebuild their homes without fundamental tools and fundamental materials, such as cement.

The inability of the Kurds to import these supplies not only prolongs their agony, but it also prolongs dependence on the United States and other sources of international aid. Every day, the United States is drawn deeper into its role as economic provider to the Kurds. The \$110 million that was included in the recent Supplemental Appropriations bill for Operation Provide Comfort will continue to grow each year. The cost of supplying the Kurds with equipment, which they could readily import themselves, places unnecessary expenses on American taxpayers.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is time for the United States to encourage the U.N. Security Council to lift the embargo on the areas that are being administered by the elected leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurds are making a valiant effort to become independent and self-sufficient. Rather than impeding that effort, we must actively support it.

Indeed, with appropriate support from the international community, the Kurds would be able to utilize some of the natural resources at their disposal. For example, Iraqi Kurdistan is endowed with rich oil deposits but is unable to exploit them because it lacks refineries. Cessation of the international embargo would enable the Kurds to import small refineries and to begin producing their own fuel, oil and petroleum products.

In closing, I would point out that what is most disturbing about our current policy is that it penalizes equally those Iraqis seeking a more democratic rule and those who remain loyal to Saddam Hussein. This "equal treatment" sends the wrong message to the region. We should be rewarding the one segment of the Iraqi population that has succeeded in freeing itself from Saddam's rule -- not punishing it.

The people of Kurdistan deserve the opportunity to achieve self-sufficiency and permanently remove themselves from the grasp of Saddam Hussein. The U.N. embargo must be lifted if that dream is to be fulfilled.

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Written Statement submitted to the

Europe and Middle East Subcommittee
of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs

IRAQ, SADDAM, AND THE KURDS: POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS

by
Dr. Laurie Ann Mylroie
of the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy

February 23, 1994

This statement is based, in part, on research in Iraqi Kurdistan, financed by the United States Institute of Peace, for the writing of a book, Kurds, Turks, Arabs, and America: Developments in Iraqi Kurdistan Since the Gulf War.

Dr. Mylroie is grateful to the U.S.I.P. for its support.

Almost three years ago, after the Gulf war ended, the Iraqi population revolted against Baghdad. Just a few weeks previously, in the middle of the war, the U.S. president and other coalition leaders had urged the population to "overthrow the dictator" Saddam Hussein. But with the war over, the United States did little to assist the uprising. There was exaggerated concern about becoming mired in a "quagmire," while the argument was made, and accepted by President Bush, that Iraq's Sunni Arab-dominated army felt threatened by the sectarian nature of the predominantly Kurdish and Shi'i revolts and that if Saddam were allowed to crush those revolts, the army and other elements of Iraq's "Sunni elite" would combine to oust him. Also, concern existed about Iraq's "territorial integrity," which, it was argued, was threatened by the revolts. So, on March 26, 1991, the White House gave Saddam a green light to crush the revolts.

The result was not a coup, but the flight of most of the population of Northern Iraq to the borders and even greater horrors in the South, for which there were then no international witness... The arguments made at war's end proved wrong and the Bush administration was eventually obliged to modify its Iraq policy. But the revisions to its policy entailed only incremental, ad hoc adjustments, never a strategic reassessment, and new beginning and a determined effort to oust Saddam.

The Clinton administration has largely continued its predecessor's policy--relying on economic sanctions to precipitate Saddam's downfall, although the Clinton team is more sympathetic to the Kurdish and Shi'a elements of the Iraqi population and more supportive of democracy in Iraq. Still, absent any egregious provocations from Baghdad, this administration, like its predecessor, does not do a lot. The result has been a prolonged stand-off.

I would like to begin by addressing problems in the way that the American bureaucracies that deal with Iraq conceive of the situation, really it is an issue of conceptualization and priorities. Then I will turn to problems associated with the prolonged stalemate in Iraq, including a problem that gets too little attention--the possibilities of Saddam Hussein's revenge. I will conclude by mentioning some measures which might be taken now to increase the pressure on Saddam.

I. CONCEPTUALIZING IRAQ: KURDISTAN AS A STRATEGIC ASSET & THE HEART OF THE IRAQI OPPOSITION

"Most of the British officials in the Baghdad Ministries and departments were as fanatical as any nationalist Arab in their refusal to admit that these Kurds had any right whatsoever to their assistance. . . ."

Cecil J. Edmonds, Kurds, Turks, and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in Northeastern Iraq, 1919-1925.

Maintaining Iraq's "territorial integrity" has been a top priority for many in the U.S. government bureaucracies that deal with Iraq. In some respects, it is a legacy from the Bush administration, which, in the name of "stability" was committed to the territorial integrity of every existing state, including a number which no longer exist, such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

But the commitment to Iraq's territorial integrity, at least on the part of Middle East experts, also reflected an orientation toward the Sunni Arab dominated power structure in Iraq. The dominant idea at the Gulf war's end was that the desirable solution was a coup that would remove Saddam, thereby preserving the Baathist structure of government, preventing chaos, and maintaining Iraq's "territorial integrity."

This led to a bias toward what was called the "Sunni Arab elite" and a disregard for most of the Iraqi population. It was the operating assumption of the Bush administration at the Gulf war's end. But it was wrong. There was no coup, despite the Bush administration's coddling of those around Saddam, as reflected in the decision not to press for war crimes trials and otherwise not to protest the repression exercised against by the regime against the Kurdish and Shi'a elements of the population.

That idea--Iraq's territorial integrity equals stability equals the Sunni Arabs--persists. It is reflected in U.S. policy toward the Kurds of Northern Iraq. A commitment to Iraq's "territorial integrity" is often code for a policy aimed at limiting and constraining the Kurds, and otherwise ensuring that the present situation does not promote Kurdish nationalism and the eventual separation of Iraqi Kurdistan from the rest of the country.

Many anomalies follow. Although the international embargo on Iraq is intended to punish Saddam Hussein's regime and precipitate its overthrow, there is an effort to enforce the embargo on Northern Iraq as well, where Saddam's writ does not run. In some ways the embargo on the North has been more vigilantly enforced than that on the territory Saddam controls.

Ba'ghdad has had considerable success smuggling in materiel and rebuilding its infrastructure. Iraq proper is hooked up to the international telecommunications system. You can dial Ba'ghdad from the United States. But the

telephone system in Kurdistan scarcely functions. One cannot call overseas; there are considerable problems calling between and within cities, and often that too is impossible. Thus, everything is more difficult and more expensive, because it is necessary to get in a car and go to another place to do a job that would ordinarily be done by telephone. The telephones do not work in Kurdistan because of the U.N. embargo, but they do in Baghdad, because Saddam had the wherewithal to circumvent the embargo.

Similarly, Iraq is pumping and refining oil. It is even selling oil product to Iran, which is short refining capacity. The Kurds, however, are not allowed to utilize the petroleum in the areas they control. Thus, in some ways, the embargo has been applied more rigorously in the areas that Baghdad does not control than in the areas it does.

Sometimes the efforts to apply the embargo against the Kurds become silly and comical. The United States is the only country in the world which formally prohibits its citizens from travelling to Kurdistan except under special circumstances. One organization came up with a project to teach about democracy in the University of Sulamaniyah. This project was initially refused on the grounds that it violated sanctions against Iraq.

The obsession with maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity increases the burden of the humanitarian relief effort. To the extent that the region can be moved toward self-sufficiency, the cost of the relief program would be less and those resources could be used elsewhere. Similarly, U.S. reluctance to deal directly with the elected Kurdish government increases the costs of the relief effort by adding unnecessary intermediaries to any program.

Iraq is Already Split

The emphasis on maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity is particularly strange because Iraq's "territorial integrity" no longer exists, in the sense of one political authority controlling the entire country. There are two political authorities within the territory designated "Iraq" on the map. How can one have as a goal maintaining something which does not exist?

Moreover, it should not be assumed that "Iraq" can easily be put back together. Iraq's reestablishment would presumably take place only after negotiations between an Arab authority in Baghdad--the successor to Saddam's regime --and the Kurdish political leadership. Because the Kurds have established viable political institutions and shown to themselves, in the first instance, that they can govern themselves, they will be in a strong position to press their demands. Those demands probably will include "federalism" and the inclusion of the city of Kirkuk in the Kurdish region.

There is a tendency to assume that the Arabs who control Baghdad are properly the rulers of Kurdistan. However, this cannot be taken for granted. The reestablishment of Iraq

will require Iraq's Arabs to demonstrate good will to the Kurds.

The attitude of the Arab states towards the Kurds affects the views of the Kurdish population. Of all the Arab states, only Kuwait has sent a delegation to Kurdistan and offered significant aid. Arab governments should not assume that it is an Arab right to rule Kurdistan. If Arab states are really concerned about reconstructing Iraq after Saddam falls, they should be involved actively in projects which will promote understanding between Kurds and Arabs. The present Arab position, the obsession with maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity, while ignoring the fate of the Kurdish population, is not helpful.

Kurdistan is the Home of the Iraqi Opposition

In many ways the obsession about Iraq's "territorial integrity" reflects outsiders' being more sectarian than the Iraqi population itself. Iraqi Kurdistan is not just a Kurdish area. It is also the principal base for the Iraqi opposition, particularly the Iraqi National Congress which is building an impressive institutional presence in Kurdistan.

The INC has a critical role to play because it serves as the sole institution which can co-ordinate the activity of Saddam's opponents. Totalitarian regimes survive by atomizing the population they rule. Each individual mistrusts the other; none can work together.

Notably, the nature of the INC is evolving. When it was first founded, it was largely an exile organization, based in London. Many INC elements have remained there, but others have moved to Kurdistan. Those in London are becoming irrelevant as those in Kurdistan are joined by defectors from inside Iraq and increasingly constitute a larger, more effective, more organized opposition to Saddam.

In Kurdistan, the INC has media offices for radio, television, and newspapers, some number of which are smuggled south into Iraq proper with every issue. The INC also maintains a refugee camp and is building the nucleus of a small armed force. The INC has American support, but it needs more, both political and financial.

Looking at Northern Iraq as the home of the Iraqi opposition, rather than looking at it in sectarian terms, as the home of the Kurds, strengthens the argument that it is better not to apply sanctions to Northern Iraq, or to do so in the most minimal way possible, consistent with the international diplomacy necessary to keep sanctions on the areas of Iraq that Saddam controls. The more prosperous Northern Iraq is, the stronger the Iraqi opposition, and the more that those living under Saddam's control chafe at their situation and look for an alternative.

Kurdistan in Strategic Terms

The obsession with Iraq's "territorial integrity" has obscured another key point--the U.S. benefits strategically from the fact that Saddam does not control Northern Iraq. Among the misconceptions that prevailed immediately after the war was that it was to the American advantage that the Kurds should reach an agreement with Baghdad. There were autonomy negotiations then, and the U.S. slyly encouraged the Kurds to reach a deal with Baghdad. Of course, any agreement with Saddam would have been worthless, which is why the negotiations failed. Still, had the Kurds erred and concluded such an agreement, Saddam would be in control of the North, and still in power. Moreover, the Iraqi opposition to him would be much weaker.

The Kurds have played a key role in promoting an Iraqi opposition to Saddam. The Kurdish political parties were much stronger and more well-established than that of the Iraqi Arabs. The Kurdish parties were essential to helping the INC overcome an initial period of divisiveness. They provided a stable mooring, which prevented the regional states, like Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, from succeeding in their old games--sowing divisions and playing off one group against the other in order to keep those they are dealing with weak and under their control.

Additionally, the fact that the Kurds hold territory was very important for the development of the INC. It allowed the Iraqi opposition to begin the transformation from an exile group to an indigenous force within Iraq. Had the Kurds followed that first American advise to reach an agreement with Baghdad, Saddam's prospects would be much brighter than they are today.

Furthermore, the U.S. could do much more to take advantage of the fact that the Kurds control Northern Iraq. The area borders Iraq and Iran. People are constantly passing between Kurdistan and Iraq proper and Kurdistan and Iran. It is an excellent place from which to gather information about those two countries, the two biggest challenges to American interests in the Middle East.

For example, it would be very useful to establish an intelligence gathering capability in Iraqi Kurdistan, aimed at obtaining information on Iraq and Iran. No such capacity exists. Both Kurdish and INC officials, would be aware of any significant program, even if it were clandestine, and they say none exists. The first head of the allied coalition's Military Co-ordinating Commission, Colonel Richard Nabb, sought to have a DIA officer assigned to assist him in Zakho. Even that modest request was refused, useful as it might have been for America's ability to understand developments in that region.

II. THE COSTS OF STALEMATE: POLITICAL REPRESSION and ECONOMIC DEPRIVATION

Those who would defend present policy maintain that economic sanctions are causing Saddam to grow ever weaker; Saddam is "in his box;" and there is no need to do more.

Much of that may be true, but one should be aware that the Iraqi population suffers severe hardship during this stand-off. It suffers from the regime's cruelty. Saddam is wreaking a terrible revenge in the south, where canals one kilometer wide have been built to drain the marshlands. The U.N.'s Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights in Iraq, Mr. Max van der Stoel, has documented the atrocities against the population in repeated reports, which have produced little action.

Also, the situation is hard on the population economically. In Kurdistan there is a fairly competent relief program. The U.S. Congress played an important role in seeing that that program existed and worked. The Kurds are very grateful.

Still, there is suffering. The population of Dohuk governance, some one million people, have been completely without electricity for over six months. Last summer, Baghdad cut off the electricity to that governance, the one Kurdish area which got its electricity from the region under Saddam's control. There was no effective American or U.N. response to that move, and the situation was allowed to become permanent.

And everywhere in Kurdistan, the poorest, the weakest and most vulnerable are hurt. This summer, I saw a clinic full of severely malnourished babies, and I assume that there must be many such clinics. In the rest of Iraq, the situation is infinitely worse.

Finally, we should be aware of the very significant achievements of the Iraqi Kurds, both the population and its political leadership. For three years the Kurds have run their own affairs. Not every people is capable of that. The Somalis destroyed their community. Yasir Arafat claims he needs hundreds of millions of dollars in international aid in order to administer the West Bank and Gaza.

The Kurds have established a viable self-government with minimal outside aid, under two embargos, and with many enemies seeking to make trouble for them. But one cannot assume that this situation can last forever, that a population can retain its cohesion in the face of so many problems. This winter, for example, there were armed clashes between the PUK and Islamic Kurds. The problem has been contained, but the fighting was very frightening, not least to the Kurdish population.

In short, the premise of the present stand-off is that the Kurds will continue to govern themselves effectively. But that is no small thing to ask, given the constraints that the international community imposes on them.

Lifting Sanctions will do More Harm than Good

However, lifting sanctions on Iraq is not the answer to the present stalemate. If Saddam again had revenues from oil sales, his military machine, not the population, would be the first beneficiary. With the resources to restore morale in the army, Baghdad would attack the Kurds. Lifting sanctions will give Saddam the wherewithal to fight his enemies. Lifting sanctions means betraying the Kurds as well as the democratic Iraqi opposition.

Moreover, it should be recognized that it is impossible to enforce long-term weapons monitoring in Iraq. The notion that one can do so is an exercise in self-delusion born of the euphoria that came with the Gulf war's end. Once sanctions were lifted, they would be difficult to reimpose. Now, lifting sanctions can be prevented by a veto of one of the Security Council's Permanent Five. If necessary, the United States can simply say we do not agree to lift sanctions. But if sanctions were lifted, then reimposing them could be prevented by a veto. If Baghdad, in the name of national sovereignty, kicked out the weapons inspectors and otherwise rendered them ineffectual, a country like China could block the reimposition of sanctions with its veto.

Although people talk about long-term monitoring in Iraq, there is no realistic basis for assuming that such a project is feasible. Rather, the evidence is all on the other side. Thus, the resolution of the present stalemate cannot be done through lifting sanctions, but only through more effective measures to promote Saddam's ouster.

How the Status Quo Might Unravel

It would be imprudent to imagine that just because the economic pressures on Iraq are increasing with sanctions in effect, Saddam has no options. Indeed, one thing that he would like to do, and is trying to do, is to murder off his opposition. A well-placed car bomb could eliminate the Kurdish and INC leadership. That would constitute a serious blow to prospects for ousting Saddam.

Nor should it be assumed that Saddam has no options against us. Since the war, Baghdad has repeatedly promised revenge. Baghdad tried to assassinate former President Bush. As recently as January 16, 1994, on the third anniversary of the Gulf war's start, Saddam threatened, "The punishment of the criminals is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth." What does he mean? Saddam is not likely to simply wait passively for the United States to topple him by means of economic sanctions. He may take revenge and he may have already taken some steps to effect his revenge.

There are serious questions about Iraqi responsibility for the bombing of the World Trade Center. The bomb that blew up under that building nearly a year ago was the largest terrorist bomb ever to be exploded in the United States. There are two fugitive suspects, indicted in a Manhattan court, Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf and Abdul Rahman Yasin.

Both men carried Iraqi passports. Both their journeys to the United States began in Iraq. They both came in the fall of 1992. They played the most important roles in the bombing. The whereabouts of one fugitive is unknown, the other is in Baghdad. The FBI has contacted him there by telephone, through a brother, who lives in New Jersey.

There are Iraqi fingerprints all over this. And that one suspect--Abdul Rahman Yasin--is in Baghdad is very significant. Iraq is a totalitarian state, in which paranoid intelligence services suspect any independent actor. Yasin provided information to the FBI before fleeing. Unless he was working for Iraq, Yasin was vulnerable to arrest and torture, possibly resulting in permanent injury or death, if the fact that he knew the bombers and provided information to the FBI became known. Iraqi intelligence would want to know whether he had been compromised by the FBI and what, in any case, he was doing in the company of individuals capable of carrying out an act as dramatic as the WTC bombing.

All this constitutes a strong circumstantial case that Iraq was behind the WTC bombing, using the fundamentalists in New York City. But it would appear that this is a line of thinking that the American establishment does not want to explore. Many people and institutions would be severely embarrassed if Iraq proved to be behind the WTC bombing.

There are those who opposed the Gulf war and they mock those of us who "demonize" Saddam. But if he tried to blow up the WTC building, isn't he a demon? The U.S. military establishment won the war and insists that Saddam is "in his box." But if he blew up the WTC building, that box is not so tight, is it? The opinion among Middle East experts at war's end was that it was better to leave Saddam in power than support the uprisings and run the risk of the break-up of Iraq. Those people will not want to see Saddam's hand in the WTC bombing. Similarly, it would seem that the FBI had an Iraqi intelligence agent in its office and allowed him to walk out the door. The FBI has little bureaucratic interest in following the Iraqi trail.

However, there is a preliminary step that can easily be taken which would be meaningful and illuminating and postpone questions about Iraqi responsibility for the WTC bombing: Demand that Baghdad return Abdul Rahman Yasin for trial in the United States.

III. STEPS TO INCREASE THE PRESSURE ON SADDAM HUSSEIN

1) Demand that Iraq turn over Abdul Rahman Yasin to stand trial in the United States. This should be done for the sake of justice alone. The man is allegedly responsible for the deaths of six people and injuring over a thousand. There is a two million dollar reward out for him.

Demanding his return would be salutary. It would put Saddam on notice that he is a suspect. It would also alert the international community that the U.S. cannot, under any

circumstances, agree to lift sanctions, because in his mad vengefulness, Saddam threatens America proper and its citizens. Furthermore, demanding Abdul Rahman Yasin's return would weaken Saddam internally by sending the same message to Iraqis.

Asking Baghdad to return Yasin for trial in America is an obvious step. It is easy; it is just; it is meaningful. Why isn't it done?

2) Jordan remains linked with Iraq. In particular, Jordan's purchase of Iraqi oil is Baghdad's single most important source of foreign exchange, some \$500 million per year. True, Jordan purchases that oil on concessionary terms and Jordan's stability is important. But it should not be beyond the ability of the United States of America to oblige some country like the United Arab Emirates or Qatar to supply oil to Jordan on the same terms as Iraq does with the aim of cutting that oil off altogether.

The Iraqi-Jordanian oil trade is also significant because it facilitates the smuggling of contraband material into Iraq. The oil tankers are used for that purpose. I was told that personally by a defector this summer in Iraqi Kurdistan. Alan Friedman's recent book on Iraq, Spider's Web, reports that same information from entirely independent sources.

Iraq's access to Jordanian banks provides Iraq critical access to the international banking system. I was told that by another defector in Kurdistan this summer. That, too, should be cut off. Moreover, if Iraqi access to the Jordanian banking system facilitates Iraqi sponsorship of terrorism abroad, it is absolutely intolerable.

3) Ease the application of sanctions to Northern Iraq and deal directly with the Kurdish government in order to improve living conditions at minimal cost. Essential infrastructure repair would include the telephone system and electricity grid. If pumping and refining oil in Northern Iraq make economic sense, let the Kurdish government do it. After all, Baghdad long ago managed to get its facilities up and running.

4) Pursue war crimes and crimes against humanity. This was an idea raised early on by the Clinton administration, but not pursued. It remains an option.

5) There are ongoing Iraqi atrocities like the drying out of the marshlands that should be the object of repeated condemnation by the United States. American planes fly above these areas daily. It may be possible to think of bombing the earthen dikes that divert the water.

TO The US House of Representatives
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East
FAX 202-226-7829

FROM Dr. Amatzia Baram, Fellow
The Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars
FAX 202-357-4439

February 23, 1994

SUBJECT: ***US Policy on Iraq Three Years After the Gulf War***

1. "The Dual Containment"

In my best judgement, the "Dual Containment" Policy as defined and implemented so far by the Administration towards Iraq has been producing reasonably good results: it has weakened the Ba^cth regime of Iraq and has forced it to make concessions to the UN. It has not, so far, brought about a change of regime, and can not be expected to do so soon: economic sanctions by their very nature, work slowly. The insistence on keeping sanctions on Iraq until the Ba^cth regime is ready to comply fully with UN Security Council Resolutions is, thus, justifying itself. Undeniably, this policy has caused suffering to many innocent Iraqis, but it has also forced the regime to accept, at least in principle, Resolution 715 (long-term supervision of Iraq's military industry). Bearing in mind that a non-conventional arsenal in Saddam's hands is dangerous to the Iraqi people themselves in the first place, the price they are paying now in economic hardships to prevent such a development is, I believe heavy, but unavoidable. One should also remember that, rather than the embargo, it is Saddam's refusal to resort to oil sales according to Resolutions 706 and 712, that is causing most of the suffering. Furthermore, there are signs that the ruling elite, while effectively shielded from the purely economic plight, is worried. As the regime sees it, there are economic, social and political developments resulting from the embargo which may turn into political troubles. The single most important concern of the ruling Ba^cthi elite is the hyper-inflation. Their decision last November to accept Resolution 715 is one result of this concern.

On the domestic-political level there are signs that, albeit very slowly, Saddam Husayn is losing ground within his own elite. True, many Iraqis are blaming the USA for their plight. However, as indicated by the Iraqi press itself, many people have also started asking difficult questions about the wisdom of their own leadership.

It is my view that the Administration's policy of keeping the embargo on until Iraq complies with all the Security Council resolutions is correct. However, there is need to prepare now for a post-embargo Iraq which, hopefully, will also be a post-Saddam and post-Ba^cthi one. (Saddam's present cooperation with the UN suggests, though, that he believes that compliance with 687 and 715 will suffice to get the UN to lift the embargo. When the embargo is lifted, the UN ought to make sure that an infringement of the conditions under which it was lifted will be punishable by its re-imposition. Any non-Ba^cthi and non-fundamentalist regime, and particularly one that includes the Iraqi National Congress (INC), holds a promise of less militarism, more democracy, less coercion and a better record of human rights, as well as closer ties with the USA. Indeed, human rights and less militarism should be American pre-conditions for cooperation with a new regime. At the same time, however, one should bear in mind that states and societies and the perception of national

interests do not change overnight. Inter-communal and other kinds of political violence were rife in Iraq before the Ba'ath rule (1968-); Iraq tried to annex Kuwait by force under General Qasim, seven years before the Ba'ath came to power, and the decision to develop nuclear weapons was taken under the Ba'ath in 1972, but seven years before Saddam became the sole ruler of Iraq. Even when Iraq is ruled by a more democratic regime and a friendlier one to the West, the military will still have a decisive say in terms of the approach to non-conventional weapons. Historically speaking, the Iraqi military has been an exceptionally aggressive and nationalistic institution. When fused with the aggressive and nationalistic Ba'ath regime and Saddam's personality they brought Iraq to where it is now. In order that they can not overpower the government and dictate to it radical (and expensive) armament policies, it has to be clear to them that international sanctions are hanging over Iraq's head long-term. In other words, for the good of its own citizens, and for the good of its regional neighbors, Iraq needs to know that in terms of non-conventional weapons, it is on long-term probation. This has to be enshrined in a UN Security Council Resolution in an unmistakable way.

2. The Kurdish Zone as a Way to Affect Change in Baghdad

The fact that much of the Kurdish area is outside the reach of the central government is a constant source of worry for Saddam and his regime. Had it not been for the American protecting umbrella, Saddam would have tried, and possibly succeeded to re-conquer Iraqi Kurdistan. While the Regional Kurdish Government should be discouraged from any attempt to secede and declare itself independent. American and other international help to Iraqi Kurdistan may produce three positive results. It may prevent a new Kurdish refugee disaster; it may enable the Kurds to withstand Saddam's siege and not fall into his arms; and it may be yet another way to undermine Saddam's rule in addition to the embargo. The more prosperous and democratic Iraqi Kurdistan - the starker contrast with Ba'athist Iraq. The present Kurdish autonomy should serve as a laboratory and example for all the Iraqis of how things can and should be done. Once the experiment is successful (and it is partially successful even now), it should become household information in every Iraqi home. This will inevitably be the case through word of mouth, but this will take time. A short-cut may be to establish a strong TV station. It should be in the position to broadcast to Baghdad ample information on life in the freed part of Iraq. Economic prosperity in the Kurdish zone holds also a promise of curbing and rolling back the influence of Kurdish Muslim fundamentalist extremists.

What is necessary to turn the Kurdish experiment into a greater success? Right now Iraqi Kurdistan is the only place where more-or-less democratic elections took place in Iraq since 1946. Admittedly, there are still tensions between the two main Kurdish factions, the PUK and the KDP, and recently there were armed clashes between the PUK and a Kurdish Islamic group. But despite that, the coalition government of the Kurdish zone is functioning reasonably well. The main difficulty seems to be an economic one. So far American aid to Kurdistan (some \$20 m per annum) has come under an emergency program through the Department of Defense (DOD). This arrangement, while extremely successful until now, is not the best way to develop a future aid program, because it is operated by a body (DOD) that is not custom-made for such purposes, and it hinders the USA from extending the kind of help which is most urgently needed. The Kurds should not be dependent for long on hand-outs.

Kurdistan has some oil and it is a rich agricultural zone. Prosperity in Kurdistan, thus, must depend on local means, and these means should be unleashed. Practically speaking, there are a few relatively inexpensive projects that have to be pursued.

A. A small oil refinery should be built to enable the Kurds to use available crude resources and turn it into oil products. North of the 36th parallel there are a few usable oil wells within the territory under the control of the Kurdish Regional Government, especially at the Kuwisanjaq area (they are presently capped). There is no reason why Saddam Husayn should be allowed to extract oil from Iraqi soil and process it through his refineries, and the Kurds will be prevented from doing the same. The Kurds have no less right to Iraqi resources than Saddam. Such a step will free the Kurds from dependence on imports of oil products. This will greatly improve their economic performance.

B. There are two small cement factories in the area, but due to lack of spare parts they are only partially operational. This hinders the reconstruction efforts.

C. There is a shortage of combine harvesters and a problem of spare parts for agricultural machines in general. This has to be addressed before the harvest. This, too, will make the Kurdish autonomy more capable of utilizing its own resources.

D. There is need to establish a number of food processing factories. Last year much of the agricultural yield was lost due to the difficulty to reach the markets in Turkey and Iran. The Kurdish zone is a natural net-exporter of fruits and vegetables.

E. A Kurdish militia: at present there is a militia in place (consisting of the two main political organizations), but it is ill-equipped. Along the lines of the Palestinian autonomy's militia in Jericho and Gaza, the Kurdish militia, too, should be provided with light arms, clothing, boots and other non-lethal military equipment. This will boost their morale and holds a promise of increasing stability.

F. Not surprisingly there is a short-term cash shortage in Kurdistan. Those who suffer from it most are salaried officials (teachers, engineers, municipality and other officials). These are also the people who should serve as the backbone of a democratic and secular political order. The medium and long-term solution for this problem is the improvement in the economy of the region. A short-term solution could be de-freezing Iraqi assets in the USA and making them available to the Kurds, but also to other Iraqi opposition organizations that present a democratic alternative to Saddam Husayn (the INC). I do recognize, however, that this may entail legal problems and eventually prove impossible, but it should be looked into.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ
SUMMARY OF REMARKS BY GRAHAM E. FULLER
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
23 FEBRUARY 1994

-- Iraq remains the major potential crisis point in the Middle East:

- Saddam Hussein is still there; he has not changed; he will return to his old policies of revenge, expansionism, development of military capabilities and unconventional weapons as soon as he has the room to do so.
- Without hyperbole, Saddam remains the most vicious, dangerous and brutal ruler in the modern history of the Middle East.
- The problem is not just Saddam, but the entire Ba'th party that helped create him and support him; there will be no significant change in Iraq until, like the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, the Ba'th Party is gone.
- Saddam will exploit the Arab-Israeli settlement and seek to destroy it as soon as he is strong enough to do so; he will remain the champion of "Arab cause" against the West and many of his neighbors, including Kuwait, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran.
- Iraq is ever more likely to break apart the longer a brutal regime remains in power that denies the political and cultural aspirations of the Kurds and the Iraqi Shi'a.

BROAD U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ

-- U.S. policy has "succeeded" to the extent that Saddam:

- has been dislodged from Kuwait;
- suffered a disastrous military defeat;
- has lost most of his war-making capability for the time being;
- is diplomatically totally isolated;
- presides over a dwindling economy;
- has faced at least one coup attempt in July 1993 and an assassination attempt in December 1993; and
- faces significant political splits in his own family as the "end game" creates new strains.

The sanctions are biting. Saddam is getting more desperate about lifting them, but no one can yet predict the end is in sight. His overthrow will most likely come without warning.

- But, U.S. policy has "failed" in the sense that Saddam is still in power and still poses a medium term threat to the region. More to the point, Iraq, in this highly unsettled condition, remains a broadly destabilizing factor in regional politics.
- U.S. policy should unambiguously call for a new democratic order in Kuwait. Any military commander that eliminates Saddam must understand that Iraq is not off the hook, cannot rejoin the community of nations, or free itself completely from sanctions until the new order is inaugurated:
 - new constitution;
 - restoration of Parliament;
 - national elections, possibly supervised by the UN;
 - the establishment of democratic processes that will represent all elements in the country; and
 - it may be that some kind of federal system will be required if the Kurds are to remain part of Iraq.
- This admittedly highly intrusive policy is based on Saddam's extraordinary violation of international norms over the past decade and a half including launching two wars on his neighbors, sweeping and gross violations of human rights, executions, torture, the use of poison gas against his own people, creation of massive refugee flows out of the country that are a burden to neighbors and to the international system, and the quest for weapons of mass destruction.
- Failure by the U.S. to articulate its desire to see Saddam fall has led to widespread speculation in the region that the U.S. prefers to keep Saddam in power, as a means of justifying its own military presence in the Gulf. Indeed, Saddam himself helps perpetrate this myth to convince the Iraqi people that opposition against him is hopeless.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

- Maintain the sanctions as long as possible; tactical problems at the Security Council emerge on the sanctions once Saddam is certified to have complied fully on nuclear weapons. Creative diplomacy will be required on how to extend sanctions, or make them apply to other UNSC resolutions (especially 688) that stipulate new kinds of behavior in Iraq. France and Russia will be less inclined to go along with indefinite sanctions on other non-nuclear issues.
- Resolution 688 needs to be fleshed out on its specific meaning as relates to protection of human rights, minority rights, etc. This should include inspection of prisons and attention to police state measures that are more intense in

Iraq than in almost any other state in the world.

- Attention needs to be given to all potential violations by Iraq on weapons of mass destruction; the recently reported effort by Iraq to receive shipment of solid rocket fuel -- if true -- from China by a German ship early this year, is the kind of action that gives clear indication of Saddam's intentions towards his neighbors.
- U.S. policy must also reconsider insistence on border adjustments between Iraq and Kuwait after the war that has forced Iraq to cede some small region of coastal land to Kuwait. This disputed territory may lack strategic significance, but is laden with emotional importance to Iraq, a country whose boundaries severely restrict its general access to the sea, unlike Kuwait. NO Iraqi government will ever be able to live with this. To ask the Iraqi National Congress (exiled Iraqi leaders) to accept this arrangement is to ask it to commit political suicide. This border adjustment, under duress, act creates a time bomb in Iraqi politics for the future. The U.S. would be able to deal with Saddam from a position of much greater strength if it were to permit proper adjudication of this issue as Iraq wants -- it would separate U.S. desire to remove Saddam from punishing the country of Iraq more broadly on border issues at a time when Saddam has weakened it.
- War crimes trials against the Iraqi leadership need to be pursued to keep the heat on Saddam and to make a point about the extraordinarily abusive character of the regime which has called down these extremely intrusive measures against Iraq now.
- Create a safe haven in southern Iraq where Iraqi Shi'a are subject to gross human rights violations, wholesale destruction of villages, the destruction of the entire marsh land village culture, etc. This issue is increasingly complex to arrange through the UN, but it would be helpful to further delegitimize Saddam's rule in this way if it could be managed.
- Iraqi Kurdistan should not be treated as a liberated Kurdish region, but as a liberated region of Iraq. The U.S. does not seek to break Iraq up, yet we and others are embarrassed by the autonomous Kurdish region in the north. As liberated Iraqi territory it is of great importance in continuing to attract broadcasting, and representational offices of all opposition Iraqi groups of all stripes. This enclave needs to be strengthened and relieved of the Iraqi sanctions applied against it.

\$2,000,000

REWARD

Diplomatic Security Service



At approximately 12 noon on February 26, 1993, a massive explosion rocked the World Trade Center in New York City, causing millions of dollars in damage. The terrorists who bombed the World Trade Center murdered six innocent people, injured over 1,000 others, and left terrified school children trapped for hours in a smoke filled elevator.

Following the bombing, law enforcement officials obtained evidence which led to the indictments and arrests of several suspected terrorists involved in the bombing. ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN, one of those indicted, fled the United States immediately after the bombing to avoid arrest. YASIN is now a fugitive from justice. YASIN was born in the U.S., moved to Iraq during the 1960's, and returned to the U.S. in the fall of 1992. He possesses a U.S. passport. Because of the nature of the crimes for which he is charged, YASIN should be considered armed and extremely dangerous.

The United States Department of State is offering a reward of up to \$2,000,000 for information leading to the apprehension and prosecution of YASIN. If you have information about YASIN or the World Trade Center bombing, contact the authorities, or the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. In the United States, call your local office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or 1-800-HEROES-1, or write to:

HEROES
Post Office Box 96781
Washington, D.C. 20090 - 6781
U.S.A.

ABDUL RAHMAN YASIN

DESCRIPTION

DATE OF BIRTH	April 10, 1960
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	156 92-9858
U.S. PASSPORT NUMBER	27082171, issued on 6/21/92 in Amman, Jordan
IRAQI PASSPORT NUMBER	M0887925, in the name of Abdul Rahman S. Taher
PLACE OF BIRTH	Bloomington, Indiana
HEIGHT	5' 10"
WEIGHT	180 pounds
BUILD	medium
HAIR	black
EYES	brown
SEX	male
FACE	white
NATIONALITY	Iraqi
CHARACTERISTICS	Possible chemical burn on right thigh Epileptic; takes medication for condition
ALIAS	Abdul Rahman Said Yasin, Aboud Yasin, Abdul Rahman S. Taha Abdul Rahman S. Taher



WANTED BY THE FBI

AIDING & ABETTING; IMPORTATION, MANUFACTURE, DISTRIBUTION AND STORAGE OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS

RAMZI AHMED YOUSEF



FBI No. 229 845 RA4

Photo taken 9/1/92 Photo date unknown

Aliases: Ramzi Yousef Ahmad, Rasheed Yousef, Ramzi Ahmad Yousel,
Kamal Abraham, Muhammad Azan, Ramzi Yousel, Rashid Rashid,
Kamal Ibrahim, Ramzi Yousef Ahmed

DESCRIPTION

Dates of Birth Used: May 20, 1967

Place of Birth: Iraq (also claims United Arab Emirates)

Height: 6

Weight: 180 pounds

Build: medium

Hair: brown

Characteristics: usually clean shaven

Social Security Numbers Used: 136 94 3472 (invalid SSAN)

Iraqi Passport Number: MO3723693125

NCIC FOPIT4PO18DIP11417?

Eyes: brown

Complexion: olive

Sex: male

Race: white

Fingerprint Classification: 14 O 29 W IOD 18

I 19 W IOD

CRIMINAL RECORD

Arrested 9/1/92 for knowingly and willfully making false statements on documents (Title 18, USC, Section 1001).

CAUTION

YOUSUF ALLEGEDLY PARTICIPATED IN THE TERRORIST BOMBING OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER NEW YORK CITY, WHICH RESULTED IN SIX DEATHS, THE WOUNDING OF NUMEROUS INDIVIDUALS, AND THE SIGNIFICANT DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY AND COMMERCE. YOUSUF SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.

A Federal warrant was issued on April 1, 1993, by U.S. District Court Judge, Southern District of New York, charging Yousef with Aiding & Abetting (Title 18, USC, Sec. 2) and Importation, Manufacture, Distribution and Storage of Explosive Materials (Title 18, USC, Sec. 844 (i)).

IF YOU HAVE ANY INFORMATION CONCERNING THIS PERSON, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR LOCAL FBI OFFICE. TELEPHONE NUMBERS AND ADDRESSES OF ALL FBI OFFICES LISTED ON BACK.

William J. Sessions

DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
TELEPHONE (202) 324-3000



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


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